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ABSTRACT
The following thesis attempts to develop a descriptive model that explains
European multinationals response in the construction industry to a restructuring
of their upstream client base forced upon them by the unfolding pressures of
what is referred to as Globalization. It integrates frameworks and models from
strategic management, organizational theory, and economics in predicting
competitive forces and thus strategy formulation for European, multinational
construction companies.
Three extensive case studies of construction companies from different European
countries represent the underlying data that support this thesis' propositions. The
companies' strategic decision-making, the implementation process both from an
organizational and market perspective and the financial outcome have been
analyzed over a period of 5 years each, between 1996 and 2000. Data has
primarily been collected from annual reports; investment banks' research reports,
press coverage, interviews and personal experience.
Thesis Supervisor: John B. Miller
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. John B. Miller and Prof. Fred
Moavenzadeh for their insightful discussions, constructive comments and
numerous revisions of this thesis over the past two years. The experience at MIT
has been and will always be invaluable to me. MIT's system's approach to civil
engineering with its numerous interfaces to other disciplines has fueled my
intellectual curiosity in a variety of ways.
Many, hopefully lasting, friendships have developed. I would like to thank all of
them, especially Messrs. Benjamin Cheatham, Melhem Samaha and Jose Suazo
for bearing with me.
I reserve my last acknowledgement to my parents and would like to express my
deepest appreciation for their support, love and encouragement throughout the
time here in the United States of America.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. The Origin of Strategy
3. Strategy in Construction
3.1. Cultural Barriers
3.2. Components of Strategy
3.2.1. Means of Strategy
3.2.1.1. Industry Perspective
3.2.1.2. Firm Perspective
3.2.2. Scope of Strategy
3.2.3. Fields of Strategy
3.3. Consequences
4. Formulating a Strategy
4.1. Setting the Stage
4.2. Globalization and IT Change Industry Structure
4.2.1. Globalization
4.2.2. Information Technology
4.3. Impact on Company Strategy
5. Organization follows Strategy
5.1. Structure
5.2. Boundary of the Firm
6. Three Case Studies
6.1. AMEC
6.1.1. UK Construction Market
6.1.2. Company Background
6.1.3. Formulating a Strategy
6.1.4. Implementation
6.1.5. 5-Year Performance
6.2. Dragados
6.2.1. Spanish Construction Market
6.2.2. Company Background
6.2.3. Formulating a Strategy
6.2.4. Implementation
6.2.5. 5-Year Performance
6.3. Hochtief
6.3.1. German Construction Market
6.3.2. Company Background
6.3.3. Formulating a Strategy
6.3.4. Implementation
6.3.5. 5-Year Performance
7. Research Findings and Conclusions
Bibliography
4
1. Introduction
After WWII the European construction industry had experienced high growth and
healthy margins. A similar, though sometimes shifted, economic cycle emerged
in all major countries. Fueled by the need to rebuild the continent throughout the
60's and huge construction demand on the Arabian Peninsula in the 70's and
beginning 80's as a result of spurring oil prizes led to static and inflexible
corporate structures unable to cope with a maturing market and thus diminishing
overall construction activity. Suffering from a disadvantageous industry structure,
the effects of globalization and information technology seem to herald and
facilitate a long overdue restructuring and thus a need for strategy formulation
and firm-specific organizational structures.
2. Origin of Strategy
At the most fundamental level, strategy is about defining goals and then making
choices based on these goals. Before making a choice, one analyzes the various
options. These options are often mutually exclusive and therefore trade-offs have
to be taken into consideration. Even though the idea is very straightforward,
strategic thinking in a business context is met with considerable suspicion. There
are two reasons. First it is fairly new in business and second, conclusive
evidence between a company's strategy and its effect on company performance
is difficult to measure.
Even though the field of strategy has drawn explicit attention in business for just
over 30 years coinciding with the foundation of well-known management
consulting companies, the underlying dynamics and forces are very old. In fact,
business strategy is the application of evolutionary theory coupled with human
beings' ability to reason and think logically'. In both cases, there is a constant
competition for scarce resources.
In evolution or natural competition, the fate of a species is dependent upon its
ability to both prevail over competitors fighting for the same resources and to
Henderson, Bruce: Founder of The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 1989
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successfully adapt to changing environmental conditions. The determinants of its
fate though are by and large a function of pure chance and the laws of
probability. In business, on the other hand, humans can use their unique abilities
to anticipate and accelerate the direction of change or business evolution.
Nonetheless, there is no denying the fact that strategy only reduces but never
eliminates the effects of chance and probability. If two companies compete for
the same customers with the same product, then one of the two will most likely
fail in the absence of other competitive advantages.
The effect of reasoning and logic and thus strategy on business evolution is
shown by the enormous pace and acceleration of technological improvements
since the Industrial Revolution in general and WWII in particular. Progress in
natural evolution is measured in generations or centuries, whereas companies
publish their performances in quarterly reports. In fact today, technological
breakthroughs threaten to outpace advances in the human sciences. The current
discussion on biotechnology is an example where the humanities struggle to
respond to technology and suggest ethical and moral boundaries for justifiable
applications.
If strategy accelerates business evolution, then why is business strategy rather
new? As shown in the first paragraph the underlying reason is that a prerequisite
for strategy is both the existence of alternative options and the ability to pursue
them. In a business context it means that companies need markets that are
large, unregulated and legally enforceable. These are the very ingredients of a
free market economy, a pretty young success story itself. Therefore, the richer
the environment (competitors), the greater the number of variables or unknowns
and hence the more important strategy becomes both as a proactive and a
reactive instrument. Proactive in the sense that it helps to win against
competitors and reactive in the sense that it helps not to be beaten by your
competitors.
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Business was, by no means, the first application of strategic thinking. Its most
important fields have for centuries been politics and war. Famous contributions
include Machiavelli's "The Prince"2 and Clausewitz' "On War"3. Even in every day
life the freedom to make choices necessitates thorough planning and thus a
strategic approach. Job searches are such an example.
The process would most likely look as follows. Based on past experience, talents
and objectives, one would hypothetically envision the perfect job. This job, in
turn, would be translated into and compared to characteristics, which commonly
differentiate job descriptions. These are industry (product), function, location and
payment. After screening and thereby limiting the available opportunities, one
comes up with a number of leftovers. Since all the remaining options only seem
to be available, one has to account for external factors, which further reduce the
number. These are the state of the economy, the company's performance and
the competition for the job. In the end, a plan is thought of to pursue the most
promising options.
This example leads to the second reason why strategy is met with suspicion.
How much of a successful job search is pure luck and what credit can be given to
a strategic approach? What portion of a company's profit increase has to do with
intended and deliberate strategic action? The answer is: We don't know. There
could obviously be two reasons for that. Either strategy is lots of nonsense or we
lack the adequate financial models, tools and frameworks to account for all the
unknowns. The latter is more likely the case.
Suppose a composite material is tested for its long-term durability under different
environmental conditions. The experiment isolates the variable, which is being
tested. This means, all other conditions, i.e. length of testing or load pattern, are
identical between the specimens. In doing this, a sound basis for comparison is
2 Machiavelli, Nicolo: The Prince (Italy 1513)
3 von Clausewitz, Carl: On War (Berlin 1832)
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established. Once we move from the natural sciences to social behaviors,
experimentation becomes more difficult, because variables cannot easily be
isolated. On a higher level even, an organization consists of multiple humans,
thus making any isolated quantitative analysis almost impossible, because there
will never be two identical organizations acting in the same environment in the
same way.
Obviously, the quantitative analysis of companies' performances is an entire
industry itself. Taking a look at their precision though, shows, that the correlation
between the applied models and a company's actual stock price is miserable.
The existing models poorly reflect a company at any given point in time, because
they can't grasp the complexity of an organization and the external forces acting
upon it. It is obviously even more difficult to isolate the effect of strategic decision
making over a lengthy time period.
Correlation of Financial Measures and Market Value
EVA (Economic Value Added) R2 = 50%
ROE (Return on Equity) R2 = 35%
EPS (Earnings Per Share) R2 = 18%
Graph 14
It is the very essence of strategy to be an all-embracing concept. It tries to
account for changing environments and anticipates competitors' actions.
Therefore, the inability to accurately measure its effects on a company's
performance by no means discredits the field. It rather reveals the need for better
financial models.
3. Strategy in Construction
3.1 Cultural Barriers
As stated earlier, the potential impact of strategic thinking correlates with the
openness of an economy. Therefore, cultures, which generally view company
4 Jones, Stewart and Company, "The Economic Value Added Approach to Corporate Investment", 1995
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failures or "creative destruction"5 not only to be necessary, but wanted for
economic progress, experience more emphasis on strategic thinking.
Management consulting, for example, is a much more mature industry in the US
than in Germany, because Germany's economy is based on long-term relational
contracts between all stakeholders, i.e. unions, banks, shareholders and
employers, as a guiding principle6 , thereby conserving the status-quo. The
hypothesis is that the downside risk from potential apathy is less than what is lost
from continuous breakup in the Anglo-American model. The forces of global,
especially capital, markets, though, seem to push Germany towards a more
liberal approach now.
The extent of strategic thinking among industries differs just as much as it does
between countries. A recent study7 among the largest 400 construction
companies in the US revealed that companies demonstrate an awareness of the
need for market expansion, but lack the ability to formulate and implement a plan
for strategic positioning. The factors that, most likely, inhibit strategic thinking are
the following. First, there is the industry's setup, second, it is the project-based as
opposed to product-based nature of the business and third, a client, instead of
being offered a built building, generally asks for construction services.
The distribution of company sizes in any industry is usually driven by its maturity
and the availability of economies of scale. These economies can be both cost
and price-related. For example, the ratio of fixed to variable costs demands a
minimum size or a global customer might pay a premium for being offered the
same service around the globe. In construction, it is evident that the industry is
essentially equally fragmented in most countries around the world. The reasons
are twofold. Overhead or structural costs account for only 5%8 and markets have,
5 Schumpeter, Joseph: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1949
6 Hall & Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage,
Oxford University Press, 2001
7 Chinowsky & Meredith, Strategic Management in Construction, Journal of Construction Engineering and
Management, 2/2000
8 UBS Warburg, USA, 2001
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by and large, been local. Even large industrial customers have pursued a
regional procurement strategy. These factors have limited a growth strategy's
potential competitive impact when compared to evolving, high fixed costs
industries such as semiconductors.
Since construction companies have success rates of 10% - 30% only on the
projects they bid for, a thorough understanding of each project's participants and
dynamics is crucial in allocating a company's resources. Therefore, the project-
based nature of the business trains construction companies' tactical skills. The
absence of any kind of medium or long-term product cycle, though, just as much
hinders strategic thinking, because strategy differs from tactics with respect to
the time horizon and the inclusion of external factors. Strategy tries to map
medium-term actions and goals and it accounts for overall changes in the
marketplace. These are attributes, which are not supported in the construction
business9.
Finally, construction is the response to requests. These are RFP's (Request for
Proposals) and RFQ's (Request for Qualification). Similar to the last paragraph,
such a reactive business does not encourage an environment where proactive
thinking is abundant. Thus, companies risk concluding that the market size is,
what is being asked for, not what might be needed. This, in it itself, limits
opportunities, choices and a strategy's success.
3.2 Components of Strategy
In a business context, a strategy's ultimate goal is the creation of a firm specific
competitive advantage. Generically, a competitive advantage improves the
relative positioning of a company against one or many of the players that are part
or threaten to be part of the chosen market. Commonly, these players are
suppliers, customers, distributors and (potential) competitors. Thereby, a new
9 Tatum: Process of Innovation in Construction Firms, Journal of Construction Engineering and
Management, 1987
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business equilibrium in a static market is formed. A competitive advantage, in
turn, ought to lead to superior firm performance. Typical performance indicators
are either accounting-based (ROE, ROA) or market-based (price/earnings, stock
price). This is notwithstanding the fact that conclusive evidence between the
underlying models and a strategy's effect, as stated earlier, is difficult to come by.
It has been argued earlier that strategy is about making choices. In order to make
a choice, three questions have to be answered. How is change pressed ahead
where is change needed and what is needed? In business, it corresponds to
what are the drivers of a successful strategy, what is the unit of analysis and
what field is being looked at? The last two are fairly straightforward, whereas the
first dimension is the most crucial.
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3.2.1 Means of Strategy
One of the crucial questions in strategic management research is what creates or
affects a company's competitive advantage. Over the last 25 years, the focus of
research for finding determinants of competitive advantage has gradually shifted
11
from an outside to an inside firm perspective. The analysis to explain a firm's
superior performance has moved from industry structure to a company's
resources, capabilities and more recently its internal organizational structure.
3.2.1.1 Industry Perspective
Porter 0 has shown that a company's performance is not only dependent upon its
firm-specific sources of competitive advantage, but it is rather predetermined by
the industry the company chooses to compete in. His work builds on the
industrial organization economics school of thought, which was originally
developed by Bain" in the 50's and states that industry structure determines a
firm's conduct, which then determines economic performance of the firm. Since a
firm controls the output, it would try to achieve above-normal returns at
consumers' expense by creating monopolistic power or fixing prices. His ideas
have influenced numerous forms of government intervention, such as anti-trust
legislation, to maintain competitive markets. In the 80's, Porter then "reversed the
original objectives.... and instead of seeking ways to assist policy makers .... he
uses the framework of industrial organization economics as a way to describe the
attributes of an industry that make the industry less perfectly competitive and
thus assist firms to find alternative ways in obtaining greater economic returns on
their business investments."1 The main characteristics are the relative power of
buyers and suppliers, barriers to entry and exit as well as the threat of a
substitute product.
In Bain's theory, firm conduct and thus a firm's economic performance is
predetermined by the industry structure. Therefore individual firm conduct is
irrelevant. Although the model adequately describes performance differences
between industries, the model fails to describe obvious variations in relative firm
performances within an industry. Therefore, Porter identifies an industry's
10 Porter, M.E. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press, New
York, NY, 1985
" Bain, J.S., Industrial Organization, John Wiley & Sons Inc, NYC, 1959
12 Kale, Serdar, Competitive Advantage in the Construction Industry: Firm-Specific Resources and
Strategy, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1999
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structure to be both a threat and an opportunity to each firm at the same time.
Instead of being deterministic or fatalistic, a company's success depends on its
ability to operate within such an environment and hence formulate a viable
strategy. From there on, acknowledging the theories of economics as a starting
point, but at the same time realizing the pitfalls of overly simplistic assumptions
such as "perfect competition" and increasingly embracing notions from
evolutionary theory and social behavior to describe company performance, the
focus has shifted to firm specific sources of competitive advantage.
3.2.1.2 Firm Perspective
Resources are essentially a company's tangible and intangible assets. Tangible
assets can be machinery or capital and intangible assets include the employees'
skills and the company's patents. In an effort to account for ever faster business
and products cycles, which increases the threat of a company's resource to
become suddenly obsolete as a source of competitive advantage on the one
hand and appreciating a human brain's superiority over any machine in the long
run on the other, researchers discovered a company's capabilities to be of more
lasting value in today's dynamic business environment.13 An employee-specific
skill has become a company-specific capability, once an organization has made
a specific know-how available to the entire organization, thus multiplied its
benefits and thereby created proprietary business processes. A capability is
thought of to be a superior source of competitive advantage, because first it
cannot be readily revealed unless a corporation is analyzed over some time and
second it is imbedded into the entire organization. Hence, a company is less
vulnerable to the departure of individual employees and copying a company's
capability is made difficult due to the company's collective organizational learning
curve.
13 Stark, Evans & Schulman, Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of Corporate Strategy, 1992
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More recently, a company's organizational structure has become a focal point as
a potential source of competitive advantage. Ever since Adam Smith14
proclaimed the benefits of the division of labour, which leads to specialization
and thus productivity increases, business organizations have chosen a
hierarchical and static command and control structure. It took robots and
semiconductors, which easily excel any human being's processing speed, in the
latter part of the 2 0 th century to realize that the true value of an organization's
employees is their ingenuity and creativity. The trade-off between retaining
control within an organization and fostering as well as facilitating creative, cross
boundary thinking by taking into account the structure of workflow, the boundary
of an organization and the culture of the firm has, since then, been at the heart of
organizational research and hence company performance.
3.2.2 Scope of Strategy
In the broadest sense the scope of a business strategy is confined by the size of
the market, for now irrespective of how right the sizing has been. The market
usually corresponds with an industry. An industry is made up of competing
participants. These are companies. And finally, given the special nature of
conducting construction work, the project is the smallest unit of analysis.
3.2.3 Fields of Strategy
With increasing popularity of business strategy as a field, the idea of strategic
thinking has extended into virtually all parts of a corporation. Since the
dominating corporate organizational structure has been a functional one along
the company's different activities, the field of strategy has evolved around these
functions as well. Cheah' 5 proposes an open-model describing corporate
strategy, which is composed of seven different fields. These are business,
operational, information technology, marketing, technology, human resources
and financial. These different fields of strategy can be represented along a
" Smith, Adam: Wealth of Nations, 1776
15 Cheah, Charles Y.J.: Reconceptualizing Corporate Strategy, and Linking It All Together, MIT, 2001
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continuum of increasing uncertainty. In this context, increasing uncertainty
means that serious decision-making has to account for more and more external
variables and unknowns. These could be macroeconomic changes, competitors'
actions and technological breakthroughs.
Uncertainty
Predictability
Human Resources
Operational
Marketing
Information Technology
Technology
Financial
Business
Internal Strategy External Strategy
Graph 3
For practical purposes of this thesis, a separation of the seven fields into external
strategy and internal strategy seems to be appropriate. Generally speaking,
internal strategy deals with the optimization of business processes, whereas
external strategy is concerned with securing the medium- and long-term viability
of the business model.
3.3 Consequences
The project-based nature, a re-active mindset as well as local markets have led
construction companies to perform much better within the fields of the internal
strategy, than in formulating and implementing an external strategy. Allocating
resources on a project-by-project basis and dealing with each project's
uncertainties in order to build prototypes over and over again is the core-
15
competence of a construction company. Strategic management has been given
much less attention.
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Developing from a skill-based, project-focused enterprise into a capability-based,
knowledge-sharing company, though, is the major challenge for construction
companies in the coming years. Whereas in consumer goods and process
industries, resources such as specialized equipment, patents and brand
recognition constitute significant parts of a company's competitive edge,
construction companies rarely have these assets. The resource base of a
construction company is, by and large, its human capital. Highly trained and
specialized project managers, superintendents, estimators, design engineers and
skilled craftsmen build the backbone of a construction company. Unfortunately
though, know-how and best practices is imbedded in these people as tacit
knowledge 16 and thus not made available to the company as a whole. Therefore,
a company's ability to take full advantage of this know-how, multiplying its
16 Slaughter, Sarah: Innovation and Learning During Implementation: A Comparison Of User and
Manufacturer Innovations, 1993
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benefits and thereby experiencing an organizational learning, and thus weaving
its key business processes into hard-to-imitate strategic capabilities, that
distinguish it from its competitors in the eyes of customers, is limited.
On top of the inherent cultural barriers in construction, neither the tools to
facilitate such a transformation have existed until recently. Major differences
between manufacturing and construction include building prototypes and
assembling the product at its final point of use. Hence, the ability to automate the
construction process by using robots and machines is limited per se. Automation,
though, has been a major driver in transforming manufacturing industries into
capabilities-based companies. The ongoing IT-revolution seems to have a
similarly deep impact on transforming businesses and might help construction
companies to make better use of its skills.
Currently, construction companies compete on a project-by-project basis. In an
environment, where skills are imbedded in individual employees only, external
strategies have little room for success. Economies of scale cannot be achieved
and hence company size as a differentiating factor in competing for projects does
not exist. For these reasons, the industry has been as fragmented as it is and
even relatively large construction companies merely represent multiple small
companies competing with others of similar sizes in their respective geographic
markets.
In Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter 17 develops a model for strategic
positioning in mature industries. Within the context of two aspects of the
competitive environment, namely competitive advantage and scope, he deduces
three main strategic options open to organizations that wish to achieve a
sustainable competitive advantage. These are cost leadership, differentiation and
a niche strategy. He describes mature industries are those, which have little or
no growth in sales and tend to be dominated by large companies. These
17 Porter, Michael E.: The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, 1980
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companies seek to apply one of the three generic industries he identifies.
Choosing none of the above and thus being "stuck in the middle" is a recipe for
failure.
Competitive Advantage
Low Cost Product Uniqueness
Overall Cost Differentiation
Leadership
40
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Construction certainly fits Porter's definition of a mature industry. On the other
hand, large companies do not dominate as he predicts and small niche players
are rare. Rather, companies, by and large, compete on the same basis,
irrespective of their size, for the reasons cited earlier. Both in the design and
execution phase of a construction project, scale economies are missing due to
the local nature of markets, and the inability to cost-effectively exploit and
transfer skills on a company-wide scale did not permit a broad differentiation
strategy. Hence, construction companies in Western Europe have found
themselves in the course of the past two decades exactly where Porter does not
want them to be: in the middle, being stuck in a downward spiral, competing on
price only.
Construction has deteriorated into a structurally unattractive industry throughout
most of Europe. Once again borrowing from one of Porter's vast frameworks on
18
firm strategy and industry attractiveness, he developed the 5-forces tool 8, with
which to analyze the attractiveness of industries. The determinants are the
buyers' and suppliers' power, the threats of new entrants and substitutes and
finally overall rivalry in the markets.
Graph 6
Entry barriers are low, since anyone can start a construction business without
much capital or specialized assets, such as equipment or certificates. Although
there are differences depending on the type of construction, strong customers
and suppliers characterize the current boundaries of the construction industry.
Process industries have large integrated players on both sides of the value chain.
For example, building an oil refinery plant, involves companies, such as Shell
and BP on the buyer side, ABB, Schindler and others on the supplier side and in
the case of a power plant, Siemens and GE, being a buyer and specialty supplier
(turbines) at the same, brutally put the screws on a construction company's
bargaining power.
Whereas small and medium sized companies try to increasingly focus on a niche
market both geographically and in the product dimension, the larger players have
come to realize that their organizational structure and size would not permit a
competitive advantage, but even turned into a structural disadvantage.
18 Porter, Michael, Competitive Advantage, The Free Press, NYC, 1985
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Porter' 9 identifies four basic value-adding corporate business strategies20. These
are portfolio management, restructuring, transferring skills and sharing activities.
A portfolio strategy becomes outdated, because, in increasingly efficient capital
markets, investors can pick pure-plays themselves. Neglecting restructuring for
the moment, the sharing of skills and activities between autonomous business
units would justify a central corporate overhead and thus be a viable corporate
strategy. Their absence in construction, though, has led to poor stock market
valuations.
4. Formulating a Strategy
4.1 Setting the Stage
Industry Structure -+ Company Strategy -> Organizational Structure
Drivers Consequences Strategy Organization
Globalization Outsourcing Extent Services Vertically disintegrate
Consolidation Internationalize Vertically disintegrate
IT Capabilities Specialization Product Grouping
Exhibit 7
Triggered by the forces of globalization, structural characteristics of the
construction industry will change. Both the size and the scope of the markets,
which construction companies compete in, will alter. Facilitated by information
technologies, economies of scale emerge, the creation of firm-specific
capabilities is enabled, and hence company size matters and determines the
choice of sources of competitive advantage. Whereas today in Europe,
companies of all sizes compete on the same basis for the same projects in their
countries' regional and local markets, large and small companies will, in the
19 Porter, Michael E.: From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, Harvard Business Review, 1987
20 Corporate Strategy = Justifying the cost of coordinating multiple autonomous business units within a
single corporation
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future, develop complementary skills. Large, European construction companies
will follow their global customers, vertically disintegrate due to the continuous
heterogeneity of construction codes and regulations in various countries,
specialize in products and source execution capabilities from regional contractors
on the spot or by forming long-term joint ventures.
4.2 Globalization and IT Change Industry Structure
Information technologies and globalization have changed the way that firms
formulate, implement and sustain competitive advantage. Moreover, information
technology and telecommunications are catalysts behind the globalization of
many industries affecting international corporate strategy formulation.
4.2.1 Globalization
A comparison of organizational structures of companies, which market
construction services, reveals that in Continental-Europe2 1 the integrated design-
build contractor at risk has historically emerged to be the dominating form,
whereas in the US, a much richer variety, including construction managers with
and without risk, design-build contractors, general contractors and engineering
firms, exists. Since there is no difference in production technologies between the
two regions, the cause for varied marketing approaches for the same end
product must have its roots in a fundamentally different procurement method on
the demand-side.
Once an industry evolves from growing into maturing, competition intensifies in
the given market. Companies compete for the same opportunities, margins
decline and one company's gains are another's loss. It is a zero-sum game. Then
Porter's Generic Strategies model unfolds its effects, thereby forcing companies
to choose either cost or differentiation leadership. Increased pressure on a
company's cost structure leads to the outsourcing of non value-added activities.
Whereas the development as such is essentially the same across industries and
21 The UK being somewhat a hybrid between the two
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markets, the speed of the subsequent consolidation positively correlates with the
size of the available market.2 2 Historically, market sizes had been aligned with
national boundaries due to the inherent costs, i.e. taxes and tariffs, of selling
products and services across countries.
Graph 8
For this reason, comparable industries in the US have traditionally consolidated
faster than in Continental-European countries. In addition, industries with a high
fixed to variable cost ratio benefit from economies of scale above average and
thus consolidate more rapidly. High fixed costs result in relatively higher capital
expenditures and thus a need for investments in constructed facilities. Therefore
capital-intensive industries, such as oil&gas, automotive, chemical and
pharmaceutical, represent important client bases for construction companies and
their buying behavior directly impacts construction companies' response to
market and package their services.
In Germany, for example, BASF, a chemical and pharmaceutical conglomerate,
or Volkswagen, the automotive giant, maintain to have substantial in-house
design and engineering capacities comprising the entire value chain of a new
plant up to the point of actual construction. These include the identification of the
plant location, design, packaging the project, procuring the project and finally
managing the various fields and disciplines. Similar organizations in the US have
instead either moved to entirely source these activities from the construction
sector or, in an effort to retain control, formed joint ventures with engineering and
design companies.
22 Regulation being another major driver
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Vertical Joint Ventures in the US
Company Partners Industry
InterGen Shell & Bechtel Power Plants (Nuclear)
URS/DuPont URS & DuPont Remediation
Duke/Flour Daniel Duke Energy & Flour Daniel Power Plants (Fossil)
Parson/BellSouth Parson & BellSouth Telecom networks
Jacobs/Equistar Jacobs Engineering & Equistar Chemicals Chemical Plants
Exhibit 9
Historic economic developments in the US provide a road map for future
evolution of the construction industry on a global scale forced upon by the
increasing effects of globalization. Consolidation and the outsourcing of activities
in major capital-intensive industries in the US over the last 30 years resulted from
deregulating markets. Deregulating markets essentially means tearing down
barriers to entry, i.e. tariffs and taxes. At the very moment, countries around the
world, realizing the limitations to prosperous growth within their own borders,
form supranational organizations, which structure the ability for products,
services or labor to move freely across borders. The degree to which markets are
being liberalized among these countries, though, varies significantly. For
example, the right to take on a job and live in a certain country irrespective of
your nationality, as long as the country is part of the union, is a cornerstone of
the EU. The same freedom to move does not apply to NAFTA or WTO.
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The current phase of rapid deregulation throughout the world results into equally
enormous consolidation pressures in capital-intensive industries in these
countries. The pressures can be seen every day. Even though equity markets
23
have dried up around the world since last year, M&A activities in the European
chemical, pharmaceutical, oil, gas and automotive industries has not
decelerated. Once again making an analogy to the US, an increasing outsourcing
of activities should coincide with increasing company sizes. Given the size of the
European Union and the extent of liberalizing the market, such a development
should be most rapid there. The disposal of activities on the client-side opens up
opportunities for European contractors to integrate backwards and will put them
in a better position vis-s-vis its international competitors, because location and
thus client proximity will remain to be a competitive advantage.
The forces of globalization are not restricted to the private sector. In fact,
countries and thus political systems increasingly compete with one another. The
rationale is as follows. Corporate investment decisions are based upon the costs
of the asset and its expected returns over the entire lifespan. These returns are
discounted at a rate, which accounts for the riskiness of these proceeds. Risks
come in several forms, among them being the environment or country risk, in
which the asset is deployed. In the past, the differential between, for example the
US and Venezuela has been huge. Therefore investments in emerging markets
had to generate higher absolute returns to have the same value or ROI or EVA or
whatever measure finance provides, in order to be considered by corporations.
These days, an increasingly intertwined world economy, resulting from the
before-mentioned trade unions and free market zones, makes it less likely,
because more costly, that individual countries jeopardize private investments,
thereby reducing the influence of country risk on investment decisions. This, in
turn, affects political systems in more developed countries, such as France and
Germany, because a more stable environment23 was an asset in attracting
investments and thus offset higher taxation on corporate and capital gains in the
past. Triggered from pressure to make the public finance system more attractive
to global corporations, persistent budget deficits and a phase of decreasing
ideology in European politics, countries have started to reassess the degree of
23 Among other factors, such as skill base of work force and proximity to clients.
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public sector involvement. The outcome is a varying, but widespread retreat from
activities, such as infrastructure, health care and education in Europe, which
opens up opportunities for the construction industry.
A second derivative from consolidation and outsourcing is a client's insistence to
be served around the globe by the same company. To minimize risk and retain
control, clients want long-term relationships with their supplier base. This will lead
to an overall reduction in the number of suppliers a company will work with and
hence, the pressure to internationalize and grow, in order to deliver the same
quality of service around the world is passed down the value chain. Analogies
can be drawn to the automotive industry. Companies, such as DaimlerChrysler,
GM or Toyota have radically cut the number of key suppliers for their products.
Given the rationale of the past few pages, one would expect that, due to a more
radical consolidation in the US, pressures to grow would have been past down to
the construction industry in some fashion. Conventional wisdom, though, tells
one, that the US construction industry is not only fragmented as such, but more
so than in most European markets. A quantitative proof goes beyond the work of
this thesis, but two reasons put doubt on this assertion. First, the US is looked at
on a national scale, which is not the nature of most construction markets and
second, categories and rankings do not represent rivalry and competition well.
They merely divide design and construction and sometimes distinguish between
the allocations of risk (CM at and without risk). Reality, though, shows that most
construction companies are highly specialized along the product dimension.
Work is only pursued in specific industries varying from education, retail,
institutional, commercial, heavy, restaurants to the mentioned industrial clients.
4.2.2 Information Technology
Information technology applications will help to provide such worldwide,
consistent service in an organizationally cost-effective way. Current computing
technologies are providing construction professionals with access to rapidly
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expanding information repositories and evolving communication capabilities. This
access has profound implications for the construction industry in several areas
including better communication between dislocated offices within the same
company, client relations and the management of the various participants of a
single project.
The facilitation of real-time communication and sharing of information have
always been considered critical to achieving efficiency, and this is what IT
systems are attempting to deliver. Examples include collaborative teamwork,
integration of inputs, sharing of knowledge, training and development. There is
widespread recognition that IT is one of the enablers or facilitators for achieving
construction business innovation and integration of the inputs from diverse
contributors in a given project or organizational unit.24 However, this potential is
not yet fully understood or captured by the bulk of the construction industry. The
real-time integration of knowledge and expertise of diverse participants in the
planning and decision-making processes on projects and business unit
operations is being fostered by many client organizations. Although there are
examples of prudent and effective use of IT as an integrating system, in the eyes
of the vast majority of construction organizations, IT is still synonymous with word
processing, electronic spreadsheets, simple database applications and, most
recently, e-mail.
A prerequisite for taking advantage of information technologies is the
computerization of workplaces and companies. A recent study in Canada25 has
shown that the dissemination of computers in the industry has greatly improved.
The research findings were that computer applications in the fields of word-
processing, spreadsheets, database and project planning had increased on
average by 25% to about 85% over a period of 5 years. At the same time
24 Davenport, T.H., and Short, J.E.: The new industrial engineering: Information technology and business
?rocess redesign, Sloan Management Review, 1990
5 Rivard, Hugues: A Survey of the Impact of Information Technology on the Canadian AEC Industry,
Concordia University, 2000
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business processes had remained to be virtually unaffected. Redesigning these
processes, though, is the decisive transformation, which will enable a company
to achieve scale economies and organizational learning effects. As stated earlier,
know-how in the construction industry is primarily imbedded in people as tacit
knowledge. Computerization promises to divide this know-how from its original
bearer. The networking effect of the Internet, then, enables to collocate
knowledge bearers, thereby promoting core competencies and making these
organizational capabilities accessible to the entire company irrespective of the
separation of its origin and the final use.
4.3 Impact on Company Strategy
The changing industry structure has a profound impact on how the industries'
participants will compete for projects in the future. Size increasingly will matter
and thus implications for multinational corporations (MNC's) and small to
medium-sized enterprises (SME's) will differ.
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As discussed earlier, the dominating organizational structure in Continental-
Europe is the integrated design-build constructor at risk. It is likely that MNC's will
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Overall Cost Differentiation
Leadership
Cost Focus Different. Focus
gradually dispose of their execution capabilities and position themselves
exclusively in the design-engineering sphere, because mastering maximum
global integration of capabilities and managing local responsiveness seem to
become mutually exclusive paradigms within the same organization. Similar to
partnerships upstream, stable geographically exclusive relations might also be
sought by MNC's with SME's.
SME's core competence will be their understanding of local regulatory
restrictions, codes and rules, access to local labour markets and the efficient
execution of projects. Among key managerial challenges for this group will be the
creation of an organization that successfully copes with the cyclicality of
construction demand, keeping in mind that there is no such thing as inventories
in construction. This means having a cost structure, which is flexible enough to
adapt fast, but enables the company, once it comes out of a downturn, to retain
the company's assets, which are execution skills and thus will remain to be
imbedded in individuals. Information technologies should help to create
organizational capabilities, although to a lesser extent as for MNC's.
A third group of companies will follow a focused differentiation strategy. The
group, in fact, already exists. These are regional specialty-contractors whose
markets will remain to be local or regional, either because the client base does
not consolidate or because operational economies of scale cannot be realized.
Graph 12
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MNC's on the other hand will form long-term relationships with clients in specific
product areas, i.e. oil&gas, infrastructure, chemical&pharmaceutical or
automotive. These industries retreat from services along the value-chain. This
opens the opportunity to integrate backwards. They market their services on a
global scale. This should provide some immunity to regional cyclicality of
construction demand.
Promising information technologies, which enable economies of scale, and a
changing industry structure, are prerequisites to formulate a cohesive external
strategy and develop employee-skills into corporate capabilities.
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5. Organization follows Strategy
The following chapter draws on contemporary research in organizational theory.
It describes an organizational response to new business opportunities in
construction, which are the result from a changing industry structure, and
subsequently lead to the need to draft consistent strategy formulations among
European, multinational construction companies. The themes, which are touched
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upon, are how work and activities within the firm are structured, what are the
inherent trade-offs and how have the trade-offs changed. In addition, the
classical question of vertical integration or "make or buy" in the context of
construction is analyzed.
5.1 Structure
Traditionally, customer access and proximity has been the main source of
competitive advantage in European construction. Quality was taken for granted
because of universally binding codes and product differentiation could not be
built up in vast industries, because, as mentioned earlier, customers developed
know-how in-house. Therefore operating responsibilities and authority had to be
as close to customers' decision-making processes as possible. Not surprisingly
corporate organizational structures reflect this very fact. Companies are grouped
around geographic divisions. These offices differ only in size, not so in its skills
and extent of vertical integration, providing full development, design and
construction services. In essence, these are networks of highly independent
construction companies within a big construction company or holding.
In pre-globalization times this structure reflected an optimal trade-off to cope with
the distinct characteristics of the construction industry. Growth could only be
achieved if the company opened up entirely new offices in new local markets,
because assets (depending on the nature of construction services offered, i.e. in
infrastructure machinery such as cranes or in commercial office buildings project
management know-how) could not be deployed economically beyond a certain
distance from its origin. The divisional structure gives each office the advantage
of forming cross-functional teams very rapidly and benefit from the resulting
learning effect. Thus the need to coordinate is little. Close customer relations
were assured and thus a flexible organization certain.
The pitfalls of such an organizational structure lie in its duplication of activities
and the lack of collocation of functional activities. Certain engineering practices
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were to gain efficiency and more specialization if a cluster for such activities
existed. These operating inefficiencies did not have a solution before IT hit the
corporate world. It is only beginning to facilitate the use of localized know-how
beyond regions and borders. Even now, it remains to be seen if the obvious
benefits outweigh the costs associated with a "wired" construction company. One
must understand that the term "brick-and-mortar" finally fits here. Cross company
utilization of specialized assets such as know how in tunneling in a specific office
is not supported. The individual offices operate as unique profit centers whose
reward structure does not stimulate sharing of know-how with other units.
Sharing only exists if personal networks stimulate such partnering. Corporate
headquarters' ability to serve as a link between the offices is little due to its
oftentimes-lacking power base.
Many customers have outgrown their large construction partners and built up a
single interface to deal with all needed construction services worldwide. On the
other side there is no matching single point or key account manager on the
selling side. This leads to competition among offices for the same customer at
the expense of future profits. It is, in essence, questionable if the entire
construction conglomerate is more than the sum of its parts? Are any economies
of scale exploited and do they exist in the first place?
To realize the optimal trade-off between proximity to its customers and facilitate
collocation of its specialized assets to develop distinct competencies, an internal
reorganization towards increasingly grouping the business units along product as
opposed to pure geography seems appropriate. A proposition of this thesis is that
there is a pressure on part of the MNC's to use existing networks of offices
around the globe more efficiently and specialize into specific industries such as
oil, gas and others by forming long-term relations with its customers, who
outsource these services due to pressures from globalization.
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It has been argued that construction companies' organizational structure
changes from market and customer proximity by duplicating business units to
knowledge collocation by aligning business units along products and thus taking
advantage from organizational learning and economies of scale. Since there are
numerous solutions in the middle, often referred to matrix organizations, the
questions arises if there really is an optimum. Business case studies show that
regrouping an organization along two dimensions after it has had a long past of
being aligned exclusively along one dimension, is almost impossible. In addition,
customers become ever larger and, for efficiency reasons, the number of
contacts for a construction company will decrease as well. Thus the need to be
located in every region shrinks, because decision-making for prospective projects
is not regional anymore. In the longer term, grouping along products makes the
most sense.
5.2 Boundaries of the Firm
The theory of vertical integration primarily builds on Ronald Course S26 work
during the 40s and 50s and then Oliver Williamson's27 during the 70s and 80s.
Coarse argues that firms only exist, should certain barriers prevent markets from
performing properly on its own. Williamson named these barriers transaction
26 Coase, Ronald, The Nature of the Firm, Economica4, 1946
27 Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press, NYC, 1985
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costs, which result from information asymmetries among market participants, and
thus, contracts in its various forms structure the relationship between two or more
parties. Unfortunately though, written contracts, which are enforceable in courts,
have its limitations in fully describing the behaviors, motives and actions of
humans or bluntly, account for all sorts of future contingencies. The basis for
dealing with such unforeseeable contingencies is, what Williamson refers to as
relational contracts. They are by nature informal and not enforceable in court. In
fact, they are mere promises between one or more parties and hence, subject to
holdups or opportunistic behavior. Therefore, at the very heart of the matter lies a
party's incentive to act in one way or another and thus the concluding need by
the other party to have a corresponding need to control his actions or vertically
integrate, depending on the value of the holdup.
Gibbons28 sketches a model, in which an upstream party's asset is needed in
producing the downstream party's final product. At the two extremes, the
upstream party (A) could be either an independent supplier or an internal division
of the downstream party (B).
Graph 15
Depending on what the nature of the asset is, B might ask A to specialize the
asset in order to be more valuable to B. B would then most likely reward A with
28 Gibbons, Robert, Firms and Other Relationships in P. DiMaggio, The Twenty-First Century Firm:
Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, Princeton University Press, 2001
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higher compensation to reflect the added value to its final product.2 9 A significant
portion of the added value to B, be it customer service or specialty equipment, is
a promise to A, which cannot be grasped and thus enforced by a formal contract.
B becomes subject to a potential holdup by A. In addition, A's goal is to charge a
large portion of the value added to B as a premium. Its bargaining position,
though, increases with the value of the holdup. The holdup, in turn, increases
with the value of the alternative use, to which B could assign the asset. In order
to boost its bargaining position, A would take actions, which increase that
alternative value. These actions are not in A's interest, because they do not
increase the value of the asset to A's final product.
B's obvious option is to buy A and thus neutralize A's bargaining power, because
B now has the control rights over the asset's use. This would lead to conclude
that integration is always better. This is far from true, because integration creates
a new hold up problem. Since B would want continuous good quality from A, now
a division within B, B could draft a bonus plan or similar incentives to perform.
Such incentive schemes, though, are usually not enforceable and present a
promise by the management. Hence, a new holdup is created. In addition,
internalizing the A extinguishes the natural incentives provided by open markets
to deliver a good quality product. All kinds of managerial tools need to be
adopted to simulate the outside world incentives.
"Therefore", Gibbons concludes, "relational contracts must be "self-enforcing", in
the sense that each party's concern for its reputation must outweigh that party's
temptation to renege on the relational contract. Consequently, the guiding
principle is to induce efficient actions by implementing the best feasible relational
contract. This requires making the right choice about integration."
The guiding principle behind the extent of vertical integration is the downstream
party's need to control the upstream party's action, which, in turn, is a function of
29 Leaving other factors such as market power aside for the moment
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the holdup's value. It is a tradeoff between the importances of the upstream's
good or service to the company's production process and the amount of natural
competition (and hence natural incentives to perform) in the upstream
marketplace of the parts or service. Vertical integration can be represented by a
continuum of different organizational arrangements with increasing control rights.
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The interface that is being looked at in construction is between the design and
the construction phase. The specialized assets, which are at stake for
integration, are the SME's execution skills, their local knowledge of rules,
regulations, codes, labor markets and, sometimes, specialty equipment3 0. The
decision on vertical integration is influenced by SME's and MNC's opposing
cultures, an interdependence between design and construction phases, regional
nature of construction regulation and competitive construction markets.
Cutthroat price competition and differentiated knowledge management in a few
special industries require fundamentally different corporate cultures and thus
managers. It seems doubtful that both diverging paradigms can be achieved
within the same corporation. In addition, the fragmented nature of commodity
construction services provides fierce competition and thus built-in incentives to
offer fair prices. Thirdly, even though building regulation is being synchronized
30 What has been referred to as the third group, the specialty contractors, is being disregarded for now.
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somewhat on a supranational level, for instance the Eurocode in the EU, the
process of obtaining permit or certificates and accessing labor markets will
remain to be locally or regionally. Adequate know-how, though, cannot be
developed and maintained within a single organization for all potential markets.
These three reasons call for the outsourcing of the MNC's execution skills.
On the other hand, it is very well known that claims are as much a part of
construction as anything. The reason is simple. Since competition is fierce, but
relationships between client and the company are usually not ongoing, it creates
a huge holdup value for contractors to lock the client in with a low price and then
exploit its dependence on the contractor. Finally, the interdependences of design
and construction in optimizing the overall costs of the projects have been
described in literature very often. For these two compelling reasons, a close
relationship between the two entities is important.
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MNC's ought to form close and exclusive joint ventures with SME's in specific
geographic markets. Thereby, all the flexibility and blessing of a competitive
market is retained, but an ongoing, thereby repetitive, supply relationship
prevents the SME from taking advantage of a project by reducing the hold-up
value.
31 Paulson, Boyd: Professional Construction Management, McGraw-Hill
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6. Three Case Studies
6.1 AMEC
6.1.1 UK Construction Market
In a mature market and an industrialized country one expects a correlation
between construction output and performance of the overall economy defined as
the gross domestic product (GDP). Exhibit # (Output is adjusted for inflation)
shows this phenomenon well, by indicating a contraction of the construction
sector at the same the British economy was in a recession, both during the
beginning 80's and then again the early 90's.
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In comparison to other European Union (EU) member countries, the United
Kingdom is tying second place with Italy and France for construction market size
in absolute numbers, outpacing most others with an estimated growth of 3% in
2001. It is worth mentioning that the largest 5 building companies comprise
roughly 15%33 of the market, which is significantly higher than in the US (4%),
though less than in Germany (17%) for instance.
In 2000 construction output amounted to a total of roughly E 10734 bn. Quite
extraordinarily, the current economic slowdown in the UK has thus far not
32 The Construction Industry Council, www.cic.org.uk, United Kingdom
33 Euromonitor: Global Market Information Database
34 Roughly the same as France and Italy. Germany with about 6 200 bn a year.
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resulted in a decline in construction work being ordered. This remarkable
development may be attributed to two major currents that have affected the
British construction industry over the last 5 - 10 years. These are the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) and a gradual move from adversarial business
relationships to one, which embraces the notion of Partnering.
As mentioned in earlier chapters, misinterpreting Keynes and being lured by
demand-driven economics led to ever increasing public spending in many
nations of the Western world, which in turn resulted into mounting budget deficits.
Breaking with such developments among the first was Britain during the 80's.
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom emerged from the 90's recession with both
depleted public finances and at the time huge needs for investments into public
infrastructure.
"The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is one of the main mechanisms through
which the public sector can improve value for money in partnership with the
private sector. It was launched in 1992 with the aim of delivering higher quality
and more cost-effective public services. It does this by encouraging partnerships
and by involving the private sector more directly in asset provision and
operation."35 Preceding this initiative was a thorough analysis of the tasks the
public sector should continue to perform. In essence, what tasks would the
private sector be able to fulfill on its own and which ones would be a natural
monopoly, effect national security or led to inadequate quality. The analysis
concluded that airport operations, infrastructure investments, the public health
system and others, which historically and ideologically had been perceived of as
in the nation's interest and thus in the public domain, could at least be shared if
not "outsourced" into the private sector. The PFI brought private sector efficiency,
innovative procurement methods and access to private capital to the table.
35 UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions: www.local-regions.detr.gov.uk/pfi/
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At about the time, the idea of Partnering introduced new contract methods such
as the Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP). The goal is to create a climate, where
long-term relationships between the contractor and the customer, an open book
approach in financial and technical communication and joint efforts to find cost
reductions and improvements are incented.
The United Kingdom is an example of how the public sector well understood its
unique role as both a policy shaping entity and at the same time being the largest
client for construction services. The PFI along with increasing Partnering has
improved the attractiveness of the construction industry and thus resulted in
prosperous growth.
One of the companies that both benefited the most from the changing regulatory
and business environment as well as aggressively formulated a corporate
strategy to go after emerging business opportunities is AMEC p.l.c.
6.1.2 Company Background
In 1982 William Press and Fairclough construction groups merged to form AMEC
p.l.c. Its legal predecessors can be traced back to the year 1848. Since 1982
AMEC has spread geographically as well as differentiated its business services
through a number of acquisitions and joint ventures. They are currently active in
over 40 countries and the majority of work done comes from outside the UK.
AMEC is one Europe's largest construction companies and one of the largest
engineering companies worldwide with sales of E 6.436 bn in 2000. Apart from
traditional construction, AMEC has strong engineering and installation
capabilities and is present in different services.
A new CEO, Peter Mason, sparked a strategic review for AMEC in 1996. As a
result AMEC has moved into services and tried to improve margins on
construction contracts. A strong international expansion has taken off, based on
36 Based on currency exchange rate Oct. 18h 2001: 1 f = 1.6 E
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two major acquisitions in France and Canada. Non-core operations have been
divested.
AMEC has an ambition to work with selected clients in selected industries and is
strong in oil and gas. The objective is to serve these clients and industries on a
global. AMEC has partnership agreements with major customers, e.g. British
Petroleum (BP), and follows their clients around the world.
The construction business of AMEC is margin-focused with the goal to reduce
the number of contracts competitively bid for. Instead, AMEC advocates a
partnership approach, where buyer and seller share the benefits of a smoother
way of working. AMEC claims to turn down jobs that do not give adequate
margins.
The strategy change in AMEC has resulted in international growth, improved
margins and significantly out-performing its peers on the stock market. In its 2000
annual report Peter Mason is quoted saying that AMEC has "one vision.... to be
the leading provider of engineering and service solutions for the world's
manufacturing infrastructure and process industries."
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37 AMEC p.l.c.: Annual Report 2000
Exhibit # shows that AMEC is made up of three different business segments.
These are "Client Support Services", "Capital Projects" and "Investments" with
their corresponding subdivisions. These units perform the following products and
services along the value chain of constructed facilities. (Exhibit #)
Design Construction Operation
Feasibility Studies Construction Facilities management
Process Evaluation, Modeling and Construction management Asset management
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In capital projects, AMEC has its own blue-collar workforce in the UK and some
other countries. Predominantly though AMEC assumes the role of a fee-based
construction manager in areas outside the UK, especially so in the US. In certain
countries they have established joint ventures with local companies, providing
them with market know-how and readily available workforce. Thus AMEC follows
long-standing client relationships in the process industry. Facilities management
is mostly self-performed, though this depends on the value AMEC can add to on
its own. Otherwise they are outsourced, for example the cleaning of building
under management.
In terms of performance graphs # and # show the distribution of sales and profits
for the FY 2000 along geographic and business segment dimensions:
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AMEC earns most of its profits, which totaled E 158 million in 2000 in the
Services segment. That is worse mentioning because the Services' 45% of
profits were generated with a third of the overall sales. In addition, the UK is still
the most profitable market for AMEC, making up almost 75% of its profits. Thus,
its relatively even distribution in absolute profits among the three business
segments look very healthy, whereas its reliance on the home market exposes its
vulnerability to a recession at home.
6.1.3 Formulating a Strategy
Before 1996 AMEC had been growing its sales consistently. Higher sales,
though, had been the result of exposing the company to higher risk, lump sum
bidding projects primarily in the UK. As a direct result margins had steadily
declined.
AMEC's current situation is the result of two strategic reassessments since 1996.
At that time Britain was just about to emerge from a long construction crisis,
which had hit the industry hard, a falling stock price had destroyed tremendous
shareholder value and in 1995 AMEC had successfully warded off a hostile bid
from Kvaerner of Norway.
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Upon joining the company in 1996 Peter Mason reevaluated all businesses. A
few months later he decided to take the following 4 initiatives:
> Focus on Selected Core Activities
> Shift into Expanding Service Sectors
> More Partnering Work in Capital Projects to Improve Margins
> International Growth in Selected Industries
Although the macroeconomic picture looked fairly well, Mason thought the
company needed a much more stringent focus and a need to redefine its core
competences. The overall trend to outsource public activities to the private sector
on top of the Public Finance Initiative (PFI), a healthy growing economy and
deteriorated infrastructure meant good prospects for the construction industry as
a whole. On the other hand, though, a long awaited consolidation of the industry
was yet to come and hence persistent and fierce competition in the majority of
AMEC's markets would not lead to improved margins.
AMEC's role as a highly integrated traditional construction company was to
change. Instead the company would gradually move more into the role of a
construction manager. The underlying reason is twofold. First, a smaller work
force could more easily adapt to the cyclical demand of construction services and
thus lead to a more flexible cost structure and second concentrating on a
functional segment along the construction process means exposing the company
to lesser risks. Being better in a specific field as well as outsourcing work and
thus risk in part to your subcontractors reduces overall risk exposure.
The fact that operations and maintenance account for roughly 85% of a building's
life-cycle costs was not that new at the time. Changing though, similar to the
Government's initiative, was a comprehensive evaluation of capabilities in the
private sector. Fiercer competition in a more global economy led companies to
abandon those activities to which they could add any value. This reevaluation
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opened up opportunities for the construction industry in general and AMEC in
particular. In addition, services have the added beauty of recurring cash flows
since they usually come as long term agreements and thus allow to better
forecast a company's financial position. On top, capital markets honor the
improved "visibility" with a higher stock price.
The partnering approach has been explained above. It was meant to take AMEC
out of the common construction arena of adversarial relations between a
project's participants by sharing the benefits of improved collaboration fairly.
Since a lump sum, low bidding contractor always comes at the very end of the
thought process for the building, a good part of the industry has lost the client out
of sight to an extent where a one fits all solution often seems appropriate. Time,
money and quality are seen as equally imperative for all clients. Much to the
contrary, they vary tremendously. A chip manufacturer, for instance, values the
timely opening of its plant beyond all others, whereas a university might be,
above all others, be interested in the quality of a new research laboratory. Hence,
analyzing each client carefully and trying to understand its unique pain and
needs, AMEC identified and focused on selected industries, where they thought
to have unique capabilities and the growth perspective were attractive. These
include, among others, the oil & gas industry with clients such as Shell, BP and
Exxon, and the pharmaceutical & chemical industry, with clients such as BASF,
Astra Zeneca and Smith Kline Beecham. Downtime of a pharmaceutical plant or
an oil-drilling platform easily amounts to several million Euros a day. On the other
hand these companies increasingly view activities such as the optimal design
and the project management of such facilities beyond their core capabilities and
thus worth outsourcing. AMEC's objective became to move into that space,
which had been abandoned by these companies. In doing so, AMEC sought to
differentiate itself from competitors by developing proprietary knowledge, locking
into long-term client relationships and building a trusted brand name.
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Two years after AMEC had embarked on new turf, the strategy was scheduled
for review. Mason and the entire board thought that results, both in the books
and outside at the capital markets, supported their path. In fact, they decided that
the initiatives, agreed upon in 1996, should be accelerated. Hence, AMEC should
become even more selective in taking on capital projects work, repeat client work
should account for an even higher percentage of the overall work done and the
company ought to take on an even more life-cycle centered view of buildings and
facilities in selected industries.
The Annual Report 2000 says: "Over the past few years, AMEC's core business
strategy has been to generate value for shareholders by transforming the
company into a global, service-driven enterprise with a strong base of
predictable, recurring revenues from long-term clients. We have focused our
work in selected client sectors such as energy, pharmachem, other process
industries and infrastructure, where we are able to differentiate ourselves from
our competitors, add significant value for our clients and generate improved
margins for AMEC."39
6.1.4 Implementation
A successful strategy consists of formulating one, but just as well implementing it
at the same time. They are two sides of the same medal. In order to successfully
achieve the 4 stated initiatives or goals, Mason undertook the following concrete
steps.
> Alliances and Joint Ventures
> Acquisitions and Divestures
> Organizational Structure
> Withdrawal from Competitive Bidding
39 Annual Report 2000, www.amec.co.uk
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First he led AMEC into a number of alliances and joint ventures. The underlying
rationale was to quickly extent the global reach, without draining the company's
financial flexibility and leveraging existing know how through new distribution
channels. For example AMEC teamed up with Flour Daniel of the US to
collaborate on offshore, deep-water oil and gas floating production platforms.
AMEC brought its engineering and Flour Daniel its project management
capabilities to the table. In turn, both partners gained a more critical and thus
credible size. Past projects include a major contract with Shell in the Philippines.
The US$150 million contract for the Malampaya energy project includes
operational support services for deepwater sub-sea wellheads, an offshore
production platform and loading spar, a 500-kilometer sub-sea gas pipeline and
onshore gas-receiving terminal.4 In Angola, the alliance is performing project
management and engineering services for West Africa's largest deep-water
production facility. With 25,000 tons of topsides, the FPSO, located 60 miles off
the coast, will process over 200,000 BPD.41 Other joint ventures are with KH
Engineering in the Netherlands for chemical and pharmaceutical work and with
the Public Work Department of Singapore in Asia.
Since 1996 AMEC has divested companies, which accounted for cumulative
revenues of roughly E 960 million.42 On the acquisition front AMEC has
completed a number of smaller ones. Their two largest acquisitions, though, are
SPIE and AGRA.
SPIE is a leading French contracting and electrical engineering company, of
which AMEC initially bought a 41.6% share in 1997, increased it to 46% in 2001
and has an option to buy the rest for a capped price until 2002. SPIE had sales of
E 2.7 billion in 2000. 74% of these are generated in France. Its construction arm,
Spie Batignolles, accounts for about 28% of sales, where it focuses on complex
infrastructure projects. The electrical engineering segment comprises two
40 Journal of Commerce Activity, January 2001: http://www.joconl.com/archives/Jan200l/Jan24.html
41 Flour Daniel, USA 2001: http://www.fluor.comIprojects/offshore floating production.asp
42 Annual Report 2000: www.amec.co.uk
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business units: Spie Trindel, which is good for 52% of revenues, installs and
maintains all kinds of electrical equipment from high and low voltage to automatic
devices and from energy production to telecommunications and information
networks. Spie Enertrans finally is the energy and transportation arm. It
constructs and maintains power plants and lines as well as railway networks.
Operationally, AMEC has thus far integrated SPIE through a JV called AMEC
Spie Rail, in order to leverage SPIE's capabilities in the extensive railway
privatization program in the UK.4
In April 2000 AMEC acquired a 100% stake in AGRA, an engineering and
professional services company, located in Edmonton, Canada. It has revenues of
roughly E 1 billion. 85% of its business is generated in the US and Canada. Its
core strength lies in environmental engineering, where it provides services in air
quality, contaminant assessment and remediation, environment impact
assessment, socio-economic impact studies and waste management. AGRA
gives AMEC a substantial North American presence and allows it to roll out their
unique capabilities through AMEC's global distribution network.
Together these two major acquisitions have propelled AMEC a great deal closer
to fulfilling its objective of becoming a truly global company. Both companies
account for 55% of AMEC's non-UK operations given its current stake in SPIE of
46%. After having fully integrated and bought (2002) and thus consolidated the
company into its balance sheet, both will account for 75%. In an interview with
the Financial Times (FT)" this summer, Mason talked about the risk of acquiring
large as opposed to a number of smaller enterprises. He concluded that there is
a trade-off between building and preserving a company's own culture on the one
hand and creating momentum from change on the other when acquiring large
companies. In a mature industry though, such as the construction, growth
prospects can only be unleashed when changing the industry equilibrium, in
43 SPIE, France: http://www.spie.fr/
44 Financial Time, London, UK: 5/6/2001
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contrast to high growth emerging industries, where cultures are more fragile and
vulnerable to exogenous factors. Cisco's success, for example, has often been
attributed to its ability to integrate small start-ups. He went on saying that top
management assumes an even greater responsibility and their ability to
collaborate decides the merger's fate. In AMEC's case he cited this relationship
as the single most important reason for their success.
The right organizational structure in place to deliver on the mentioned strategic
promises was a daunting task. Over the following years this would be an
evolutionary process since the company's transformation would be dynamic and
reacting to market opportunities. At Mason's start he found a structure that was a
mixture of overlapping and conflicting business units.
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Services and Investments had been put together with manufacturing and homes.
At that time these segments were still young, undeveloped and their contribution
to the company's bottom line were marginal. Given Mason's intentions to focus
on support services, the increasing importance of the PFI program and last not
least the fundamental difference in doing business and hence types of risks
encountered in these segments as opposed to homes and manufacturing, a
reorganization looked inevitable. Due to AMEC's reliance on the home market, a
reshaping of business units along similar risk patterns and clients seemed the
right solution. After the SPIE acquisition and the upcoming one of AGRA, the
unfolding internationalization of the company made a reconsideration of its
organizational structure necessary. Could a business unit structure provide the
proximity to its clients, given that most markets and hence decision making were
still functioning on a regional level, even though the clients itself had become
global powerhouses. The answer was that a more decentralized and thus
geographic alignment was the way to go for the engineering, construction and
service units. Their greater autonomy on a regional scale was to ensure better
client contact. Capabilities for the energy, pharmaceutical and investments were
to be bundled and therefore worldwide units.
In its move to escape low bidding in capital projects, AMEC has successfully
focused on a few industries and key clients. The degree of repeat business is a
reasonable proxy for AMEC's achievement in partnering with clients. Its annual
report says that in 2000 75% of its sales in capital projects were generated from
its top 10 clients.
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The above graphs show how AMEC has thus far achieved in diversifying its
business as well as broaden the segments it works in and has come a long way
to becoming a global company in the AEC industry.
6.1.5 5-Year Performance
A return on sales in 2000 of 2.5% looks pretty impressive for a construction
company. Still, this is just a snapshot in time and does not, as such, allow
drawing any conclusions. To evaluate the success of both formulating and
implementing a corporate strategy, it is worth looking at a 5-year time span for a
number of different financial ratios and company figures to extract a trend. For
analyzing AMEC's financial performance and thus drawing conclusions on the
success of its strategy it is advisable to exclude the 2000 numbers, because they
include the acquisition of AGRA and thus don't reflect past action. Its success will
be better seen in a year's hence.
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One of the objectives, when Mason took AMEC's helm, was to increase
profitability, even at the expense of growing sales. The company managed to
almost triple its operating profits within four years, even though sales were
essentially flat. On the other hand, comparing absolute operating profits for these
years don't really tell much more than sufficient liquidity, because the nature of
their business has changed and thus the extent to which new businesses have
different funding needs. Hence one would compare apple with oranges. To
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overstate the point, generating E 1 billion in sales being in the chip industry likely
requires different capital than building buildings. In AMEC's case, the upfront
costs in pursuing projects within the PFI are relatively higher.
Graph 29 Graph 30
Again, excluding the 2000 numbers, AMEC's turnaround looks very impressive.
A return on equity of between 25% and 30% is very healthy, given that they
started at about 8% in 1996. The picture is almost identical for ROCE, where the
denominator includes all interest bearing liabilities as well. This shows you that
they have not taken on much debt either.
The last financial proxy for successfully formulating and then implementing a
strategy is what capital markets think of the company.
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Both in terms of absolute market capitalization as well as with respect to its peer
group in the UK, represented by the FTSE Construction & Building Index, AMEC
has shown a strong performance.
Finally it is interesting to see how AMEC has achieved in focusing on higher
value added work and disintegrated vertically, thus relying on subcontractors
more heavily in the project execution phase.
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6.2 Grupo Dragados S.A.
6.2.1 Spanish Construction Market
Given that WWII had not resulted in discontinuities of its political institutions
and/or destruction of its infrastructure, Spain underwent a different development
than much of the rest of Europe, politically and economically. The Spanish
economy was and is experiencing a similar but somewhat shifted economic cycle
compared to countries such as France, Germany or Britain. Whereas the days of
a buoyant economy fueled by strong investments in infrastructure and buildings
had not been seen in these countries since the mid-70s, Spain is in the midst of
such an up rise.
Joining the European Union4 5 (EU) on January 1st 1986 proved to be a catalyst
for Spain's4 6 development in general and its construction industry in particular.
The underlying reason is that one of the EU's long-term economic imperatives is
to balance the level of prosperity of its member states measured as the gross
domestic product per capita. Bruxelles collects money and redirects it to
countries or more specifically regions, which lie below the EU's average. These
so-called structural funds must be used for capital goods as opposed to
consumer goods. Since Spain's joining of the EU coincided with badly
deteriorated public and to some degree private infrastructure there was a perfect
match. At this moment the EU's aspired enlargement eastward, politically sought
and economically justified, threatens to put this very position in jeopardy.
It is interesting to note, that, during last year's European wide 3rd generation
UMTS telecommunication licenses auctions, Spanish Telco's are said to have
roughly paid the amount of money to governments in Germany and the UK,
which Spain had received over the years from the structural funds, which again
are in large part paid for by these same two countries.
45 Called the "European Communities" at the time, until the Treaty on the "European Union" (EU) was
ratified and took effect November 1" 1993, thus increasing the degree of integration politically,
economically and socially.
46 Along with Portugal
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Coming out of an economic crisis throughout much of the 70s and early 80s,
Spain and its construction industry have since experienced steady and high
growth, being only interrupted during the recession in 1992/93. Spanish GDP
rose 4.1% in 2000 and is expected to grow by 3%47 this year. Between 1997
and 2000 alone construction output increased a staggering 18%, is expected to
grow 6.4% in 2001, 5.3% in 2002 and thus outpaces the economy as a whole
(see Graph #). Throughout the 90s the construction sector has maintained a
share of roughly 9% of GDP 48 and even 13% of overall employment. This is
higher than in most other Western countries.
Construction activity is primarily fueled from strong demand for tourist-related
buildings and second homes, high levels of investments in infrastructure and a
structural shortage of quality housing.
Declining working hours and increasing net income in the Western world have
led to the unprecedented rise of the tourism industry around the world, leaving
some countries overly exposed and dependent. Among other countries, Spain
has tremendously benefited from this boom. Its vast coastlines in the south and
the east provided the needed land. Having initially attracted the masses Spain is
now successfully focusing on the more affluent, high-income (= spending)
clientele.
47 Estimation PriceWaterhouseCoopers: http://www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/ins-sol/spec-
int/eeo/country reports.html
48 The Economist: Country Profile Spain
54
GDP vs. Construction Growth
140 -
120-
" GDP
100-
80 i I I I " Constr
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 uction
Years Output
Construction by Segment
Housing Repair&Mainte
29% nancem 24%
Commercial
13% Infrastructure
Industrial 29%
5%
During much of the 90s house building had been the major growth driver. This
segment seems to be slowing. At the same time infrastructure investments are
hitting an all-time high with 29%49 of total construction output in 2000. After
declining in 96 and 97 in the aftermath of the 90s recession the public sector has
put together infrastructure programs similar to the PFI (Public Finance Initiative)
in the UK, which now show its effect. These are the Infrastructure Plan5 0 between
2000 and 2010 and the National Hydrological Plan from 2000 to 2008.
Ministry of Public Works - Infrastructure Investments
(E ,m, annually): 00-04 04-06 06-10
Roads 4684 4207 3606
Railway 3659 3606 4808
Airport 1723 301 1052
Ports 1014 0 902
Others 168 301 902
Total 11248 8414 11269
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A combination of a relatively high concentration in the Spanish construction
industry, where the largest 5 contractors account for 20%51 of the overall market,
and very high investments into infrastructure facilities, such as bridges, roads
and ports, led to healthy profits. Since infrastructure work is usually large and
requires higher technical capabilities than for instance office buildings, the
increased demand typically favored larger companies, who have these needed
skills in-house. Thus, competitive forces in the civil engineering arena have been
rather moderate and resulted into a number of prospering contractors, such as
Ferrovial, Dragados, Acciona, FCC and ACS, over the last decade.
In addition, the Spanish construction sector has been among the most active and
innovative when it comes to diversifying its businesses and using the huge cash
flows generated from its construction activities elsewhere. Besides moving into
49 ABN Amro Bank N.V., The Netherlands
50 Ministry of Public Works, Madrid, Spain
51 El Panorama De La Construccion, Spain: October 2001
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the services sector and applying promising procurement methods, such as BOT,
to infrastructure projects at home and in its natural "backyard" Latin America,
industries invested into include mobile telephony and energy.
6.2.2 Background
Today, Dragados is Spain's second largest construction group with sales of E 4.6
billion in 2000, of which 75% were generated in Spain. Founded in 1941 as
Dragados y Construcciones the first international base was established in South
America in 1950. Then the business diversified into real estate and transportation
throughout the 60s, before an expansion of its international operations was to
reduce its reliance on the home market during much of the 70s. Joining the EU
led to relatively higher growth at home throughout much of the 80s, thus
increasing its domestic share once again.
The Spanish construction crisis in the beginning of the 1990s struck Dragados
hard and, as a response, a series of strategic initiatives were launched to
diversify the operations and to internationalize the business with offices in Brazil,
Argentina, and Venezuela among others. It has grown strongly internationally
and tripled its international operations over the last five years. In 2000 it was the
first of the large Spanish contractors to start an electronic marketplace for online
collaboration and procurement (E-Difica.com). These initiatives were financed
through the construction cash flow and the proceeds from divestures of non-core
assets and poor-performing operations.
The most successful diversifications have been services and concessions that
have grown strongly and now account for half the profits. The expansions into
these areas have largely been organic and through joint ventures.
The strategic initiatives have, with some help from the Spanish construction
market, helped fuel growth and improve margins for Dragados and the company
has seen a significant revaluation in the stock market last year.
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Dragados' core business remains to be construction with 54% of its overall sales
in 2000. Dragados Obras y Proyectos is the holding entity under which all
construction activities at home and abroad are being managed. Dragados
Construccion is the primary operational unit, marketing its services in the
traditional building and civil engineering fields. Specialty work is done by Drace,
which was formed to bundle all specialty engineering and design knowledge,
both to leverage its value due to collocation as well as to sell it to the outside
market, instead of solely using it in-house. It works predominantly in the marine
and environmental protection filed. Tecsa's strength is railroad work, responsible
for a big chunk of the high-speed connections currently under way between
major Spanish cities. It has remained operationally independent because of its
location in the Basque region. International construction work accounts for 22%
of construction activities, 80% of which are performed by Dragados Construccion
and two subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil.
In industrials, MASA is Spain's leader in industrial maintenance and mechanical
erection for major process industries, such as chemical and automotive. CYMI is
responsible for electrification along railroads and high voltage lines, as well as
performs electrical work for power plants and dams. Others include Dragados-
Offshore, INTECSA-UHDE S.A. and Dyctel.
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Dragados has taken significant advantage of the public sector's move to
outsource activities, no longer seen as being of higher social and national
interest. These activities include street cleaning, waste collection, wastewater
treatment, power distribution and health services. Stemming from the gained
capabilities, Dragados extended into the private sector, where it has, most
notably, become Spain's leader in the management of port infrastructure
installations.
Dragados' inroad into the concession arena has been very successful. It claims
to be the world leader in toll roads. Projects are either pursued independently or
through Aurea, a company in which Dragados has a minority share of 35%, but
assumes management control. It thus far focuses on the Spanish speaking
markets in Latin American and Spain.
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Today Dragados has balanced its activities between assuming the role of a
traditional, highly integrated general contractor primarily at home and generating
recurring cash flows from less cyclical, more predictable services. The latter
already account for half its profits, which have increased ever since coming out of
the last Spanish construction slowdown in 1994/95. Nonetheless, its dependence
on the Spanish market shows its need to grow internationally.
6.2.3 Formulating a Strategy
At the end of the construction downturn during the mid 90s Dragados' EBIT had
decreased to 2.4%, whereas it had been at 4.5% just 4 years earlier. Sales had
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been flat for two years and other financial indicators, such as ROE, ROCE, stock
price, cash on hand and fixed costs (overhead) were equally discouraging. In the
face of its deteriorating position and the extent to which it had been overly
vulnerable to the economic downturn (90% of EBIT in 1993 came from cyclical
construction business before heading into the downturn), a reevaluation of the
company's objectives and where it was heading was imminent.
To reduce its dependence both on the home market Spain and lower its
exposure to the more cyclical building sector and regain profitability, Dragados'
chairman Don Antonio Durdn Tovar made moved along three dimensions:
> Internationalization
> Improve operational effectiveness
> Diversify into promising growth markets
Even though geographically diversifying one's cash flows becomes gradually less
effective in a time of "Globalization" during which increasing dependency of
national economies due to rising trade of goods and services synchronizes the
economic cycles52 worldwide, Dragados still felt that growing internationally in
specific target markets was important.
Low profitability was only in part to blame on the macroeconomic malaise.
Moreover the company had boosted its overhead and thus operational
restructuring and reorganization was needed to cut the fat and regain
momentum. Fixed costs had reached 6.5% by 1995. This compares to an
industry consensus for a healthy general contractor of roughly 5%.
The reason to diversify into other markets and segments were similar as to
broaden its geographic presence. The goal was to find a product mix that would
52 Underscoring this hypothesis is the fact that we might be on the verge of an economic slowdown taking
all three major economies, the US, Japan and Germany into recession for the first time since the oil crisis.
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balance the exposure to the country's economic cycle. Finding a mix would
alleviate the effect a recession has on Dragados' overall performance, but retains
its ability to take advantage of an exuberant construction economy. In boom
times, demand increases faster than certain ingredients of a market economy, for
example labor protection laws, allow the industry's capacity to go up accordingly.
Thus demand outstrips supply and allows windfall gains, until equilibrium is finally
reached again.
Since services in theory are less risky and generate recurring cash flows, basic
economics would suggest that returns are smaller as well. On the other hand,
though, a general trend towards outsourcing in public government as well as the
private industry leads to higher growth margins here in the foreseeable future
and thus allows relatively higher profits.
6.2.4 Implementation
The first internal program between 1996 and 1997 was named Dragados 2000. It
was succeeded by Dragados XXI and still is in effect.
Looking for growing international markets as well as being able to differentiate
itself from competitors there, made Latin-American an obvious choice.
Broadening the geographic reach had been an initiative, which in fact dates back
to 1993, but was delayed due to the problems at home.
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Coming from 13% in 1995, Dragados has on average had a quarter of its sales
outside of Spain over the last three years. In 2000, 59% of the E 1.1 billion
international sales were generated in LatAm, primarily in Argentina. The right
graph shows that this growth was not achieved on the back of higher risk, low
margin construction business, but rather in the services, concession and
industrial sector, thereby achieving two objectives at the same time.
Dragados has entered new markets by either buying market share there and
then building the business or by forming joint ventures (JV) and alliances in order
to be a credible force and sell unique capabilities
In construction, Dragados has pursued a cautious but effective way in buying
minority stakes in companies, increasing its ownership over time and then
growing organically. Permanent bases in LatAm date back to 1950, when it
opened an office in Argentina. This year Dragados acquired 50% in Via
Engenharia. The company was renamed into Via Dragados. It operates in Brazil
and on track to be one of the five largest service contractors there. Dragados
retains the option to buy all the shares.
The JV between Dragados and Spanish rival FCC, which was started in 1996 for
large-scale international civil engineering projects, failed in 1998. Concessions in
the transportation sector have all been pursued in partnership with either
AUREA, where it holds a minority interest, or others.
To improve its operational effectiveness Dragados restructured organizationally
as well as cut costs. Coming from an amorph structure with business units
without clear responsibilities and no comparable businesses along the same line
of command, the five segments construction, services, industrials, concessions
and real estate were established as profit centers with each having a single
management team. These teams report to the holding executive committee
headed by Don Antonio Duran Tovar. The holding assumes responsibility for
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financing, investor relations and foremost strategic planning. Should the
internationalization of Dragados continue in the future, a reorganization along
geographic dimension as opposed to product lines might become necessary in
order not to lose the proximity to the customers' needs.
Between 1996 and 1997 the workforce was cut by 1100 people and non-
performing assets worth E 430 million were divested.
Dragados
Group
Corporate Planning and
Finance Corporate
Corporate Human
Relations Resources
Quality and Legal
Environment Advisorv
Construc- Industrial Services Concession Real
tion Estate
Enginee- Telco New Urban Ports/
ring Technol. Services Loaistic
Graph 43
Dragados has achieved very impressive results in diversifying the company into
new markets and services. In ports management, that is container handling, tug
services and logistics, it has become Spain's market leader after only three
years. The market was created after ports were started to privatize in Spain. In
waste treatment, Dragados gained a 45% market share within 10 years. Finally in
the concession field, namely toll-roads, they have managed to take a leading
global role within 8 years. Aggressively acquiring companies and then growing
internally did achieve this.
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6.2.5 5-Year Performance
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Since 1996 Dragados has increased its sales consistently by 70%. More
impressively, this growth has not been unprofitable at all. Rather EBIT almost
tripled. In addition, increasing return on equity to 19% in 2000 gives shareholders
good reason to stick to their stocks and increasing ROCE, measured as earnings
before interest and taxes plus all income from financial activities over
shareholders' equity plus all interest bearing liabilities shows that Dragados has
not leveraged the company's balance sheet, but rather kept a stable capital
structure with a debt to assets ratio of 75%. Financial assets outnumber long-
term financial debt by more than 2 to 1 and on the current side assets
comfortably beat liabilities by 3.4%. Both current assets as well as current
liabilities, mainly accounts receivables and payables, make up the bulk (Current
assets to total assets = 56%) of Dragados' balance sheet, which is typical for any
construction company. Typically the higher integrated a construction company
the higher the share of current assets. This is due to the reason that traditional
contractors usually take on projects at risks as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon
Construction Manager, who is more of a broker between the client and his subs,
thus being paid on a fee basis and thereby reducing the incentive to take
advantage of his position. Projects at risk, in turn, mean that the company
manages and distributes all cash involved in the project. For that reason it is a
commonly agreed upon conclusion that managing cash flows more than absolute
profits is the differentiating factor between successful companies and those that
fail.
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The questions to be answered are first how Dragados has performed relative to
its peers and second how the quality of cash flows have changed over the years,
to judge both its proneness to macroeconomic changes as well as the likelihood
of extraordinary charges due to failed projects.
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Dragados' market capitalization has almost tripled over the time of analysis. In
order to judge the success of both formulating its strategy and implementing it at
the same time it is important to distinguish the extent to which its development
can be attributed to this very strategy on the one hand and the generally booming
construction market in Spain on the other. The above graph clearly shows that
Dragados has not outperformed its peers in the Spanish market, notably
Ferrovial, FCC and ACS, which have equally prospered over the last 5 years. On
the other hand the proxy used to describe Dragados' relative success represents
only companies listed on the stock exchange. Since these, by nature, are only
the large ones it fails to represent the vast number of small to medium sized
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companies. Therefore, given the fact that Spain's top 5 contractors have
increased their market share over the last five years from 15,4% to the
mentioned 20% today, it can be concluded that the bigger ones, including
Dragados, have at least successfully outperformed the overall construction
market.
Capital markets traditionally don't get very enthusiastic about the construction
sector. There are several reasons, but two of them stick out. First the industry is
perceived as mature, having little growth potential and chronically unprofitable,
thus attracting little capital. Second, the industry structure has gradually left
contractors (compared to the client, developer or bank) with the overwhelming
share of risks inherent in a construction project. Coinciding with the project-based
nature of the business (no product cycles like industries such as automobile), the
predictability or what investment bankers refer to "visibility" of construction
companies' cash flows has been very low, thereby increasing the perceived and
real risks of the cash flows.
Hence, changes in a company's business segments or product mix over time
might result into a higher "visibility" and finally lead to a lower weighted average
cost of its capital (WACC), which accounts for the very risk of cash flows by
identifying a risk premium and asset beta (P). The asset beta measures the
correlation of a company's cash flows to the performance of the overall market. A
company's beta decreases, either by reducing the cash flows' sensitivity to an
economic slowdown or by offsetting one business segment against the other and
thus hedging the sensitivity as well.
Revisiting Dragados' change in business segments and qualitatively assigning a
sensitivity factor allows judging the quality of their profits today and five years
ago.
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Dragados Business Segments vs. Sensitivity to Economic Slowdown
Business Segment Sensitivity Explanation
Construction
Spain
Civil Low Public Spending
Commercial Medium Longterm Financing
Housing High Private Spending
International
EU Medium Mostly Civil and Concessions
LatAm Medium Concession and little currency risk
Industrial
Electricity Low Related to Infrastr. Work
Energy Low Commodity
Telecom Medium Network Upgrades
Industrial High Plant Improvement in good times
Services
Water/Sewage Low Commodity
Waste Low Commodity
Street Cleaning Low Commodity
Port Management Medium Tied to Trade
Facility Management Low Commodity
Concessions
Roads Low Necessity
Airports Medium Discretionary Flying
Real Estate High Prices tied to Economy
Construction as a percentage of
Graph 51
overall sales has decreased from 74% to 54%
this year. Given that these cash flows on aggregate have the highest risk
attached to and given the growing importance of their civil work within
construction with the least risk due to the public Infrastructure Program, a
moderate economic slowdown does not seem to bother Dragados much. More
importantly though, the increases in services and concessions and the recurring
and low risk nature of these cash flows seem to be ample evidence that the
company's overall cash flows on aggregate are less correlated with the overall
market and thus should have resulted in lower cost of equity and in the medium
term its cost of debt as well, after the Basel II Accord53 takes effect introducing
new lending regulation.
53 Basel II Accord http://www.bis.org/publ/bCbsCa.htm
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the number of employees has increased
proportionally with its sales over the last five years. It shows that Dragados has
essentially remained to be as vertically integrated as they have been before,
therefore in construction at least assuming the role of a traditional general
contractor (GC).
Number of Employees Revenues per Employee
(Thousand Euros)
50,000-
40,000- 107 114 107 106
30,000- 100-
020,000- 5 I
a'96 '97 h99 '00 '97 '98 '99 '
Graph 52 Graph 53
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6.3 Hochtief
6.3.1 German Construction Market
Rebuilding infrastructure and housing capacity was the major priority throughout
much of the 50s and 60s for the Western part of a country, which had emerged
from a period of self-imposed destruction and had seized the opportunity to thrive
given by the victorious powers due to farsighted political considerations and the
immediate transition into a bipolar world order: the Cold War. The construction
industry as a whole prospered tremendously during these times. Experiencing a
setback after the first postwar recession in the early 70s the industry regained
enormous momentum.
The industry's development over the last 25 years is primarily the result of two
events: The Oil Crisis and German Reunification. The consequences are twofold.
On the one hand, temporarily exploding construction demands surpassed the
existing capacity and thus resulted into healthy margins. On the other hand
profits from these exogenous factors overshadowed an overdue consolidation of
the industry as a whole and a restructuring on a firm level. These internal
omissions coincided with the retreat of the public sector from investing into
construction services in recent years, thereby magnifying their effects up to the
very moment.
During the 80s recession most large construction companies managed to offset
losses at home with windfall profits they were making on the Arabian Peninsula.
The Oil Crisis magnified the West's dependence on Middle East oil, led to an
economic slowdown around the world, but also resulted into an unprecedented
construction boom in countries around the Persian Gulf. The countries'
inexperience in procuring construction services and temporarily defying the
economic principle of capital being a scarce resource made international
construction for most companies a very joyful experience, indeed.
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Feeling the moral obligation after 40 years of prosperity and realizing the political
need to prevent an otherwise depopulated part of the country, the East's living
standards would have to match those of the West faster than a normal economic
development would predict after the German Reunification in 1990. As a
consequence the so-called "Neue Bundeslander" (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, ThOringen & Sachsen) received net transfers as
high as 6,5% (1992) annually of the German gross domestic product over the last
ten years to boost its economy. To put this into perspective, these numbers
would mean reallocating $ 650 billion annually (GDP 2000 = $ 9963 bn) on all
levels of public office, municipal, state and federal, to Texas and California.
These two states account for roughly 20% (55 million) of the American
population, just as the five "Neue Bundesldnder" do. The money was and is
invested into business building, infrastructure and alleviating the effects of
unemployment, an unexpected by-product of a free market economy.
Graph 54 Graph 55
At the peek of the construction cycle in 1994 Eastern Germany made up 35% of
all output. In 2000 this number was still 25%, compared to the 20% in population.
For 6 years now, output has decreased every single year to around the same
level seen in 1992. At the same time the overall economy has, except for 1993,
steadily grown. In 2000 the German construction market, the largest in Europe
(20% share), still generated E 240 billion5 4 of construction services.
54 Deutsche Bauindustrie: http://www.bauindustrie.de
69
GDP vs Construction Output
130--
3 120-- Aef ""' "Constr
000 *Wf uction
110 - u110 O tpu
-6 100 - GDP
0 90
80 - I I
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Construction Segments
Public
13
Housing
Commercial 58%
29%
As mentioned earlier, fundamental reasons for the decline were the public
sector's departure from investing into and prohibiting innovative procurement
methods of construction services. Today 13% of construction output account for
the public sector. This is an all-time low in German history.
Since rebuilding Eastern Germany was heavily debt financed, public budgets hit
record debt levels by the mid-90s. This in turn endangered meeting the
Maastricht Treaty, which structured the path for the introduction of the Euro in
January 2002 and set certain entry barriers55 with respect to inflation rate, budget
deficit and total country debt. Therefore a sharp reduction in public spending was
the only solution given that tax levels gave no room. Unfortunately though,
decreasing the public's involvement in everyday life turned out to be politically
impossible. Therefore, the easy way out was to cut direct public investments,
especially in infrastructure spending.
Programs such as the PFI (Public Finance Initiative) in the UK have lacked
political support in Germany throughout all political parties. This reserve has
been both ideologically motivated, meaning that infrastructure is the public
domain, and represents respect for every car owner's vote, since operating and
maintaining an automobile is already very costly. Finally though as a first
cautious step, the German Parliament passed legislation56 in October 2001 to
attract private capital for the accelerated renewal of public infrastructure:
> Only federal construction (20% of public spending)
> Extension of 10 existing "Autobahns" from 4 to 6 lanes only
Barriers to successful private sector involvement remain. First, excessively long
and risky planning phases make an outcome unpredictable. Second, under the
current scheme companies would be reimbursed out of funds from a national
5 Ironically enough to alleviate German fears of potentially giving up its D-Mark for a weaker successor
56 Ministry of Transportation, Construction and Housing: http://www.bmvbw.de/wwwroot-bmvbw-
.302.6806/.htm
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truck toll, but would lack the right to collect and adapt tolls themselves. Among
those trying to be one of the main beneficiaries of the program will be Hochtief.
6.3.2 Background
Similar to most other German construction companies Hochtief's success over
the last 125 years resulted from the technical ingenuity of its engineers to a great
extent. Combining traditionally strong engineering schools with the continuous
need to rebuild the infrastructure after two wars, Hochtief gained a reputation for
building civil engineering structures, first at home and then in Africa, Asia and the
Middle East as well. Recent projects include both the Great Belt and the Oresund
bridges connecting Denmark and Sweden in the Baltic Sea.
Today Hochtief consists of 6 legally autonomous units. Each functions as an
independent profit center.
Hochtief Construction AG is essentially what the company used to be 10 years
ago. It comprises the geographically dispersed German construction offices.
Hochtief International is a holding company for all its international subsidiaries,
some of which have been founded many years ago, grown organically and bear
its name, such as Hochtief do Brasil and Hochtief Construcciones in Argentina,
whereas others have been more recently acquired, for example Ballast Nedam
and Leighton Holdings Limited.
The most obvious move into new markets is Hochtief Airport. Since air travel has
the highest growth rates in the transportation industry, Hochtief is pursuing
concessions to build, operate and maintain airports. Leveraging its long-standing
client relations in the public sector, Hochtief has, thus far, successfully been
awarded licenses in Hamburg, Dsseldorf and Athens. A bid for a new
international airport in Berlin is still pending.
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Hochtief Development focuses on the German market. Its business is real estate
development as well as facility management. Hochtief North America primarily
consists of Turner Construction Company.
6.3.3 Formulating a Strategy
Anticipating the end of the German Reunification related construction boom
Hochtief's CEO Dr. Hans-Peter Keitel set the following strategic goals:
> Expand the range of construction-related services
> Strongly increase international component of the business
> Restructure German construction business
Construction had proven to be a slow growing, mature market and very sensible
to economic downturns. Hence, the search for construction related services
would be an attempt to apply proprietary skills to high growth, less cyclical
businesses.
The business logic for expanding internationally is straightforward. Hochtief
wants to increase the share of repeat business in the private sector. This would
create business relations based on mutual trust and supposedly result into higher
margins. By nature though, potential clients with a recurring stream of capital
projects can only be found in large manufacturing and process industries as well
as in real estate. These industries in turn are the most blessed or cursed by what
is commonly referred to as Globalization. Globalization leads to increased
economies of scale and thus consolidation pressure. In order to handle such
large organizations management would consolidate the supplier base as well.
Hence, Hochtief had to increase its global reach.
By 1995 profits had been decreasing. The sharp downturn had shown Hochtief
how the then existing structure both in terms of vertical integration and defining a
division's market had not permitted them to respond adequately.
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6.3.4 Implementation
Graph 56 Graph 57
In pursuing the first two objectives of its strategy, namely expand into services
and grow internationally, Hochtief looked for possible acquisition targets.
Growing the needed skills and client contacts in-house would take too long.
Finally Hochtief bought Turner Construction Company in the summer of 1999.
Though keeping its second promise to grow outside of Germany with non-
German sales amounting to 70% in 2000, the first objective seems in jeopardy.
These account for only 3% of revenues.
Turner is essentially a pure play construction management company in very
traditional segments, especially commercial buildings. Whereas the distinction
between a general contractor and a construction manager is common in the US,
a transition for contractors to take on more of a management role and work
closely with subcontractors is currently underway in German construction.
Therefore Hochtief is keen to learn from Turner in managing this process. On the
liabilities side, Turner was bought at the peek of a 7 years US construction cycle
and their return on sales of only 1.3% (1st half 2001) in a still booming
construction economy look very poor. Especially, Turner will get Hochtief not a
single bit closer to move into the entire arena of outsourced public activities, for
example waste water treatment, water distribution, street cleaning or port
management. These markets are expected to open up in Germany in the
medium term. In addition integrating a company, which has the size of Turner,
will be taking on a lot of management capacity on Hochtief's side. This comes at
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a time where Hochtief is struggling to lead its German construction activities back
into profitability.
Another acquisition, Leighton Holding Limited, provides Hochtief with a company
that has strong skills in infrastructure and thus complements Hochtief
Projektentwicklung in Germany. Leighton is based in Australia and operates all
over Asia. Benefiting from the opening up of infrastructure procurement
throughout Asia in the 80s using private capital, Leighton gained experience in
innovative delivery methods and infrastructure development. In the 90s they
expanded into telecommunications, successfully forming joint ventures with
telecommunication companies in building the needed networks.
Organizationally Hochtief has transformed from being a traditional general
contractor to a multinational services company. Similar to most construction
companies in Germany and elsewhere in the world, Hochtief has traditionally
been set up geographically, having largely autonomous offices in major urban
centers aligning them with the customers in these regions. Organizing the
company geographically can result in a serious problem. Autonomy of the offices
rises and the cohesiveness of the entire organization suffers. Communication
breaks down between offices, thus skills and capabilities aren't sufficiently
leveraged among them, economies of scale cannot be achieved and eventually
the whole is less than the sum of the pieces due to corporate overhead's inherent
costs and reduction in flexibility. Hochtief realized the sub optimal structure and
set the stage to partly reorganize the units more towards a product grouping
where the market permits such action. Essentially they are trying to realize the
optimal trade-off between proximity to its customers and collocation of its
specialized assets, meaning employee know-how.
Ten years ago, Hochtief had roughly 30 offices throughout Germany. These
offices, independent profit centers, all offered the entire continuum of constructed
facilities from bridges, ports and roads to office buildings, plants and malls,
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thereby duplicating proprietary skills and being unable to efficiently deploy them.
Only their international assignments were managed centrally. The idea was to
draw on foreign subsidiaries' client contacts and combining these with Hochtief's
German specialty technical know-how.
Devlopen HOCHTIEF Aktiengesellschaft
Services
Product Civil
2000
1995
1990 North America *
Construction
Geography
Graph 58: Business Unit Grouping Graph 59: Organization 2000
Moving into new markets and thus offering new products as well as changing
clients and market conditions led to changing organizational structures over the
years. The idea is to align businesses where risk profiles and needed functions
are similar. Developing buildings, for example, has far less in common with
building buildings than often perceived. Whereas technical ingenuity and building
process efficiency are the keys to success for a construction company,
anticipating property prices and customer preferences as well as marketing skills,
make the difference in real estate development.
Upon reviewing its German construction operations a few years ago, Hochtief
disentangled civil engineering projects (Hochtief Civil) from other building
projects (Hochtief Building). In civil engineering the differentiating factor is the
uniqueness of the design, whereas in other commercial buildings process
efficiency and close client contact predominate. Therefore it created competence
centers for tunneling, marine works and power & water. On the other hand these
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competence centers have to draw on other divisions' client contact, making the
interface and incentives very difficult to define. Creating an additional
organizational layer this summer, Hochtief Construction AG, where both the civil
and the building division move closer together again, might express these
difficulties.
The same underlying rationale applied for setting up autonomous units for
Hochtief Airport, Hochtief Development and Hochtief Services. Creating
independent units for Hochtief North America and Hochtief International, though,
seems to be a sign of a company growing faster than corporate structures and
thus cultures can bear. Consistent with its move to align the business
increasingly along products, combining Turner and what used to be Hochtief
Building would have made sense. These units have very similar products and
clients in their respective markets. On the other hand the execution differs just as
much. Turner is the US's largest construction manager at risk 57. As opposed to
Hochtief Building it excels at outsourcing the majority of the work and at the
same time creates stable subcontractor relations in order to deal with the project
risk. Assuming that this skill is one of the underlying reasons to acquire Turner,
an alignment would have made even more sense.
Apart from the flaws of creating Hochtief Construction just cited, it was the last
step to create a pure holding company structure separating operational from
group responsibilities. In the past the heads of all divisions were on the executive
committee as well. Consequently a classical you-get-what-you-pay-for problem
could arise. If you are responsible for both the unit and the group as a whole, but
your performance is measured only on the unit level, your action will most likely
be biased towards that unit even at the expense of the entire group. Now each
manager has a clear-cut job description. The unit manager has to maximize
profits and reports to the executive committee. Executive level managers seek
and allocate finances, solve legal issues and define the strategy. Above all, it is
57 Engineering News Record, USA: http://www.enr.com/dbase/2001cmrisk.asp
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their challenge that the very organizational structure put in place to help the
business does not prevent the company from sharing skills and capabilities
across units. Otherwise a conglomerate can't add value. A shareholder would be
better off buying a diversified portfolio of different stocks with the same
businesses as the conglomerate. Assuming that intersegment sales be a proxy
for sharing skills across organizations boundaries, the following graph shows that
Hochtief still has a long way to go.
Graph 60: Intersegmental Sales
Past reorganizations were only part of Hochtief's efforts to return its German
construction units back into profitability. Capacity has been slashed heavily to
cope with sluggish demand. Employees in Germany have come down from
20,000 in 1996 to around 13,000 in 2000. In addition, Hochtief tried to acquire its
traditionally main rival, Holzmann AG, in the mid-90s. At the time, Holzmann was
even more affected by the downturn due to heavy losses abroad and hence its
stock price was depressed. Hochtief's was looking for a better cost structure
compared to its competitors. Finally though, the take-over was prohibited on anti-
trust grounds.
58 Intersegment sales state revenues generated between Group companies.
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(EUR thousand) External Sales Intersegment Sales5" % of Sales
Airport 2,151 19,022 784.0%
Building 1,872,470 117,674 6.3%
Civil 839,310 16,486 1.9%
Development 210,024 29,498 13.8%
International 405,567 2,159 0.5%
North America 6,228,900 - 0.0%
Services 41,326 91,489 121.0%
HQ -14,020 10,705
__ =_9,585,728 287,033
6.3.5 5-Year Performance
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Hochtief's development over the last 5 years primarily reflects coping with
worsening market conditions at home and acquiring the leading general
contractor in the US, Turner Construction Company, in the summer of 1999. In
FY 1999 Turner contributed E 1.2 bn in sales and was fully consolidated in FY
2000, thus accounting for E 6.2 bn. Therefore, excluding Turner's share, sales
decreased by E 500 m to E 3.38 bn between 99 and 00. This reduction comes
from downsizing the German construction divisions.
On the earnings side Hochtief has reported worsening numbers for the last three
years. The strain on its financial situation would have been even worse if one
excluded Turner. In 2000 Turner contributed E 100 m into the consolidated
income statement. Otherwise the loss from continued operations would have
been E -180 m.
ROE (Net Profit over Equity) ROCE (Return on Capital Employed)
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Even though showing negative EBIT numbers in 1997 and 2000, Hochtief earned
a return on its equity in all of the past five years. The reasons are twofold. First
Hochtief made E 180 m in 2000 from financial investments and second a number
of companies, in which Hochtief only has a minority share, are accounted for
after EBIT. In 2000 these equity gains amounted to E 104 m. Leighton and
Ballast Nedam were primarily responsible for this number.
To degree to which Hochtief eliminates value can be seen from comparing its
ROCE to its cost of capital. ROCE calculates operating earnings less taxes over
equity plus all interest bearing liabilities. All interest bearing liabilities includes
long-term and short-term debt, but excludes accounts payables, which usually
don't bear any interest payment. The cost of capital calculates the expected
return on its debt, the interest rate, and the expected return on the shareholders'
equity, which depends on the riskiness of the cash flows. These two costs are
then weighed taking into account the company's capital structure. This means
accounting for the indebtedness of the company.
Hochtief states that its WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) was 4.3% in
1999 and 7.1% in 2000. The change is attributed not to a less risky business but
rather to a higher leverage ratio. Comparing the cost to their ROCE, Hochtief has
lost value over the last five years.
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Its market capitalization reflects the decline in value as well. Since 1997 Hochtief
has almost cut its value in half. This is even more striking since it tripled its sales
during the same time period. It is nonetheless fair to mention that Hochtief has
performed similar as all other publicly traded German construction companies. Its
stock performance has been very much in line with the DAX Construction Index
over the last three years. Currently all top 6 German construction companies
report losses at home. Only two of them manage to offset these with profit in
international markets.
Bn ployees Revenue per Employee (Thousand
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Finally Hochtief has held its employees stable at around 41,000 since 1996.
Again this compares with tripling its sales in the same time period. This reflects
the effects of the Turner takeover. Turner is a construction manager at risk.
Therefore all projects' funds flow through its books, although over 90% of the
work is performed by subcontractors. Hence the revenues per employees have
gone up sharply.
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7 Research Findings and Conclusions
All three companies show a striking similarity in formulating their respective
strategies. AMEC, Dragados and Hochtief all have embarked on a journey to
internationalize, specialize and extend their services along the value chain. As
much as intentions were congruent, each company's implementation and thus
success has been very different. In this last chapter, a basis for measuring
success or firm performance is chosen, applied to each company and then a
number of determinants for varying firm performance, such as management,
markets and client behavior, are discussed.
Indicators for achieving these three strategic goals should be the following. Being
present in and servicing global markets and the move from a vertically integrated
construction company towards an engineering/design company ought to lead to a
reduction in the company's cost of capital, whereas specialization leads to higher
value-added work and thus higher revenues per employee.
Over the five-year period, which has been looked at, AMEC as well as Hochtief
have radically disposed themselves of their execution skills. AMEC's revenues
per employee have increased by 35% and Hochtief even achieved 175%. On the
other hand Dragados remained stable. The reason is that the Spanish
construction market has been growing tremendously and thus external pressures
have been moderate, since barriers to entry ensure a favorable competitive
environment. Although on paper, Hochtief's transformation looks the most
impressive, its rise can primarily be attributed to the acquisition of Turner in the
US. Turner is a pure construction management company in commercial
buildings, sourcing all execution from subcontractors. Although Hochtief will
undoubtedly learn and transfer skills how to manage a construction project and at
the same time pass on risks downstream to the subcontractors, Turner does not
offer Hochtief added skills in its objective to specialize in infrastructure ranging
from roads, ports and airports and services. AMEC's acquisitions, on the other
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hand, have achieved both objectives. They specialize in certain industries and
offer value-added services.
It has been argued earlier that the available financial models insufficiently grasp
the complexities of organizations' economic environments and thus the impact of
strategies on firm performances. Nonetheless, they build the only basis to
quantitatively tackle differences between companies. The models are either
accounting-based or market-based.
Market-based indicators, such as stock price or price-earnings ratio, reflect a
consensus among capital markets' participants about a company's future
prospects. Differences in supply and demand for a specific stock price result from
information asymmetries among these participants. The information can be either
irrational, i.e. trends, bubbles, "irrational exuberance"59 and rumors or rational,
i.e. annual reports and profit warnings. Since a price for any good or service,
though, is entirely based on a buyer's perceived value and less so on what the
seller thinks is right, both are equally valid.
Yet again, for purposes of comparing different companies' past actions,
accounting-based indicators should be applicable, because they rely on the
rational part or "hard" numbers and are based on past action, rather than trying to
anticipate future outcome. Hard numbers are annual reports and since these are
tightly regulated, a company's individual discretion in measuring and reporting
these is limited and hence they offer a better basis for comparison.
It is worth mentioning that room for manipulation certainly exists. Earnings per
share, for example, are a popular ratio. A company's ability, on the other hand, to
influence the bottom line of its income statement is ample. Therefore, it is
important to account for the regulatory environment's incentives when analyzing
companies. In general, the underlying reason for annual reports is to give
59 Greenspan, Alan: Senate Finance Committee, USA, 2001
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interested third parties an unbiased view of a company's situation. The relative
importance of each stakeholder, though, differs between countries. In Anglo-
American economies, annual reports are guided by financing purposes and in
Continental-Europe reporting is geared towards avoiding taxes. The reason is
that in the Anglo-American model capital markets play a much more significant
role in funding a companies' projects. In Continental-Europe, on the other hand,
long-term relations with a few banks allow companies to effectively communicate
conservative reporting practices. The choice, to do so, decreases with the
number of investors in one company.60
In addition, construction poses a special problem. Balance sheets measure a
point in time and income statements measure a time period. Accounting and
reporting practices have typically evolved to use the "Gregorian Calendar" as a
reference. A year, though, inaccurately measures the earth revolving around the
sun, but much less so business or production cycles. Whereas in most industries
these cycles becomes ever smaller and hence quarterly reporting becomes the
norm, in construction, projects often take much longer than a single year.
Therefore, special problems arise and these are dealt with differently in various
countries. Companies have certain discretion in accounting for incomplete work.
Therefore an analysis of a construction company's performance has to include
more than a single year.
There exist a number of different models to account for value creation. These are
Economic Value Added (EVA), Net Present Value (NPV) and the ratio of Return
on Invested Capital (ROIC) over the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC).
All three, if applied correctly, should deliver the same result and account for the
three main variables driving value: operating margins, cost of capital and the
competitive advantage period61.
60 Therefore most US companies have two sets of reports: for Uncle Sam and capital markets
61 CSFB, EVA Primer, 1996
83
Weighted Average Cost of Capital a d Value Creation Calculations
AMEC Dragados Hochtief
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
Equity
Risk Free Rate (%) 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Risk Premium (%) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Beta 1.18 0.9 0.77 1.2 1.15 1.1 1.2 1.15 1.1
Cost of Equity 9.6 8.7 8.2 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.4
Debt
Cost of Pre-Tax Debt (%) 7.3 7 7 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.2 7.1
Group Tax Rate (%) 25.1 28.8 29.5 17.9 20.4 20.1 24.4 38.1 0
Cost of After-Tax Debt (%) 5.4 5 4.9 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.6 3.9 7.1
Capital Structure
Debt 570 616 692 330 412 536 867 1267 1240
Equity 852 1199 1500 1484 1966 2500 2629 1785 1250
Debt/Equity 66.9% 51.4% 46.1% 22.2% 21.0% 21.4% 33.0% 71,0% 99.2%
WACC (%) 8.0% 7.4% 7.1% 8.9% 8.8% 8.6% 8.4% 7.2% 8.2%
ROIC 29.2% 23.1% 25.5% 13.8% 21.3% 23.2% 1.2% -1.4% -1.0%
Value Generation
ROIC / WACC 3.65 3.12 3.59 1.55 2.43 2.69 0.14 -0.19 -0.12
Graph 69
The above graph shows two things. First, how the cost of capital has changed
over three years for each company and secondly, taking into account ROIC as a
measure for profitability, the creation or destruction of value.
Although all three companies have reduced their cost of capital, the result is
misleading. In AMEC's case the reduction results from a significantly lower cost
of equity, which is the direct result of less cyclical long-term contracts with
companies in process industries, such as oil & gas. At the same time, it debt has
remained essentially stable, leading to a reduction in leverage due to its rising
market capitalization. Dragados, again, has been very constant for the same
reasons as cited earlier. Hochtief now, seems to have reduced its cost of capital
slightly. On the equity side, the return, investors ask for, has remained
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unchanged. The reason is that, although Hochtief has diversified internationally
into the US, the US construction market is at its cyclical peak and, again, Turner
does not provide long-term contracts in promising markets. Hochtief's lower cost
of capital in 2000 results from sharply leveraging its balance sheet. In addition,
adding debt coincided with a decreasing share price. As a consequence,
Hochtief experiences higher costs of debt in the year 2001 and increasing debt
levels have increased the likelihood of financial distress.
As suggested at the beginning of the chapter, reasons for different outcomes
could be management, markets and client behaviors. Whereas it is impossible to
judge if the respective management teams have been more or less capable in
implementing their strategies, the company's performances seems to suggest
two fundamental conclusions. First, the public sector plays an enormous factor in
shaping an advantageous or adversary construction environment and secondly,
global success seems to rely on a firm foundation in the company's home
market.
In AMEC's and Dragados' case, the public sector has both been active in
shaping strong demand for constructed facilities. It has both assumed its role of
alleviating sharp cyclical downturns by sourcing facilities in a recession and it has
been a actively promoting alternative delivery methods. Both actions formed the
basis for these companies to have success abroad. In addition, the effects of
globalization and outsourcing have been strongest in the UK and thus offered
AMEC an opportunity to fill these vacant markets and again, from there on, roll
out skills and capabilities globally.
To the contrary, Hochtief serves as an example, where a company has
progressive ideas, but the inability to gather experience at home prevents the
company from radically changing the business model. The government has
retreated from investing into needed infrastructure and refuses to open up the
home market to innovative solutions.
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An interesting analogy can be drawn to Dragados. Relying on close cultural
bonds to much of Latin-America and benefiting from experience gained at home
due to the government's initiative to open up road, port and airport infrastructure
to the private sector, Dragados has been very successful in building a leading
position in operating these facilities worldwide. Hochtief, on the other hand, has
started to enter the only market of infrastructure privatization in Germany, thus
far. Airports have emerged to be the only segment, which the public sector
seems to be willing to dispose off. Successful engagements include D~sseldorf,
Hamburg and Athens. Moving into airport privatization and thus operations
certainly constitutes a bolder strategic paradigm shift for a construction company,
when compared to roads and ports. The reasons are threefold. First, construction
costs as a percentage of life cycle costs are the smallest, thus highlighting the
need to build up or acquire outside skills; second, exogenous risks affecting
demand are very high, since a large part of air travel is discretionary, and third
the market for airport operations is relatively consolidated, thus leading to high
competitive rivalry.
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